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REDACTING RACE IN THE QUEST FOR
COLORBLIND JUSTICE: HOW RACIAL
PRIVACY LEGISLATION SUBVERTS
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
BY CHRIS CHAMBERS GOODMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of
the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be
apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere
instrument of the major number of the Constituents. This is a truth of
great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to. 1
We were created equal, but we live in a constant state of inequality, a
disequilibrium based on the inability of some, and unwillingness of others, to
disregard race and color. While some denounce the so-called "Colorblind
Paradigm" as an inappropriate societal goal, those who believe in it seem to
have been led astray by proposed "Racial Privacy" legislation. When Harry
Potter covers himself with the invisibility cloak,2 he still acts, reacts, and
causes results, while those around him simply cannot see what he is doing. If
racial privacy legislation succeeds in covering racial and ethnic statistics with
a similar cloak, people still will act (discriminate), react (retaliate), and cause
results (racial harm), but litigants will not be able to prove those actions, nor
link their results to the actors, thus subverting the enforcement of civil rights
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D. Stanford Law
School, 1991; A.B. cum laude, Harvard College, 1987. The author gratefully acknowledges the
support of her colleagues, the faculty support office, the reference librarians, the Dean's Summer
Research Grant Fund, and the Caruso Research Fellowship program. Chris Fallon provided valuable
research assistance, and Professors Bob Pushaw and Jim McGoldrick provided many useful
comments to earlier drafts. As always, my family and friends provided the inspiration and
encouragement to help me complete this work.
1. Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264, 275 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (quoting 5 Writings of
James Madison 272 (Hunt ed. 1904)).
2. See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE (1999).
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laws.
Regardless of how or whether we measure it, race counts. This simple
message has once again been debated through the voting process of the
California electorate. California was the initial testing ground for the voter
initiative that decimated affirmative action within state institutions, an
initiative that was then exported to other states. Those who were successful in
placing Proposition 209 on the California state ballot crafted another proposed
amendment to the California Constitution, which was entitled the "Racial
Privacy Initiative." It was presented to the California voters with this more
accurate title provided by the Secretary of State: the Classification by Race,
Ethnicity, Color, or National Origin Initiative ("CRECNO").3 Fortunately, the
latest potential expansion to the list of prohibitions in the California State
Constitution was temporarily deflected by voters in the October 2003 recall
election. Still, its proponents are undaunted and have vowed to bring the
issue back to the voting booths in 2006 with a modified version of the
initiative. It is likely that racial counting prohibitions will be proposed in
other states soon as well.
As its descriptive title suggests, CRECNO sought to prohibit the state
from classifying and collecting data on any individual on the basis of race,
ethnicity, color, or national origin.4 This prohibition would have been
absolute in the areas of public education, public contracting, and public
employment.5 In all other state operations, the prohibition would apply as a
sort of "proactive repeal" to prevent any such classifications, unless and until
two-thirds of both houses of the state legislature and the governor vote to
approve a particular classification.6 This Article will examine the text of the
initiative and analyze the impact and legality of its various provisions. As one
scholar has noted, CRECNO may be "the logical extension of formal
colorblindness, for it represents the vain hope that by blinding ourselves to
the
7
reality of persistent racial inequality, the problem will simply disappear.",
In Part II, I describe the background of CRECNO and its precursor,
Proposition 209, which was a victory for the antiaffirmative action forces in
their battle against preferences for people of color. That battle continues
currently in Michigan, as those dissatisfied with the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in the Grutterv. Bollinger8 have instigated a campaign
3. Proposition 54, Classification by Race, Ethnicity, Color, or National Origin Initiative, Oct. 7,
2003 Cal. State Ballot [hereinafter Proposition 54].
4. id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Pauline T.Kim, The ColorblindLottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 39 (2003).
8. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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to bring a similar antiaffirmative action measure to the Michigan voters this
fall. Part III provides a brief analysis of the text of each subsection of
CRECNO and is intended as a blueprint for analysis of any future racial
privacy legislation. It explains the ambiguity in the definitions and
procedures for approving any aspect of racial data collection and discusses the
scope and ramifications of the exemptions that would apply to the health care
industry, the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, and law
enforcement officials. Part IV discusses the constitutionality of CRECNO
under the Hunter Doctrine. 9 The Hunter Doctrine provides a test for
determining whether a political procedure implicates the Equal Protection
Clause when members of a protected racial or ethnic class are burdened more
heavily than the majority in their efforts to seek beneficial legislation. 10 If
enacted, CRECNO would establish an unequal political process burden on
those seeking to enforce their rights under existing civil rights laws. This is
not merely a disparate impact situation, which is only actionable under Title
VII," but rather is a case of intentional discrimination against the interests of
the racial and ethnic minorities in the administration of the political process,
which results in further abridgment of the ability to prove actionable
discrimination by state actors. Because people of color are more likely to
seek the benefit of civil rights law enforcement, the additional burden of
proving civil rights violations falls more heavily upon them, resulting in an
unequal political process burden that may violate the Hunter Doctrine. The
proponents of CRECNO have articulated no clear compelling interest for the
legislation, and the ambiguity of its language belies the notion of its being
narrowly tailored, and therefore this Article reasons that CRECNO would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.' 2 If a state fails
to count race, victims of discrimination will not be able to prove their claims,
and thus there will be little, if any, effective enforcement of civil rights laws
in that state.
Part V discusses how the provisions governing the recording of racial data
in the employment context may be in conflict with, and hence preempted by,
Titles VI and VII of the 1964 Federal Civil Rights Act. While discrimination
still will be outlawed, state laws will be ineffective in this area, and fewer
discriminators will be prosecuted because the pool of available proof will
shrink considerably as soon as CRECNO takes effect in a state. Furthermore,
by permitting some unlawful employment practices, CRECNO may violate

9. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
10. Id.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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the preemption doctrine. 13
II. BACKGROUND
CRECNO was a continuation in the struggle against racial and ethnic
preferences in the State of California. The preferences debate results in part
from the backlash that has been emanating from the nationwide struggle for
civil rights and the protection of antidiscrimination laws. A complete history
of the civil rights movement is beyond the scope of this Article, 14 but some
scholars reason that the civil rights struggle was an inevitable result of the
Founders' failure to confront and resolve issues of racial tension at the genesis
of our nation, or a failure to protect the constitutional rights of freed slaves
after the Civil War. 15 This refusal to explicitly address race and to explicitly
remedy inequality helped lead to an entrenchment of racial inequities, which
in turn strengthened the arguments for civil rights reform. As equal protection
gave way to preferential treatment, battle lines were redrawn, and the
antipreferences movement was born.
The antipreferences struggle in California reached its apex in the fall of
1996, when California voters approved Proposition 209, an initiative that
amended the California Constitution to prohibit the state from granting
preferential treatment to women and people of color in three enumerated
areas: public education, public contracting, and public employment ("the
enumerated state operations"). 16 These three enumerated areas comprise a
significant portion of state actions. The initiative was co-authored by Glenn
Custred and Tom Wood, and heartily supported by Ward Connerly, a regent
of the University of California system. 17 Proposition 209's simple message
was that most differential treatment is wrong if based on race or gender, and
thus it sought to eradicate any remaining distinctions between benign
discrimination (such as affirmative action) on the one hand, and invidious
discrimination (like racially restrictive covenants) on the other.18
After the voters approved Proposition 209, several court challenges were

13. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. For a brief legal history of the Civil Rights movement, see, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG,
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 3-11 (4th ed. 1996).

15. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 26-73 (1987). The only races
expressly identified in the U.S. Constitution are whites and Indians/Native Americans, though it
obliquely, yet obviously refers to slaves as "all other persons." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
16. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
17. About CADAP and Proposition209, at http://www.cadap.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
18. Proposition 209, California Civil Rights Initiative, Nov. 5, 1996 Cal. State Ballot (codified
at CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31) [hereinafter Proposition 209].
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launched.

19

In one of these challenges, Judge Thelton Henderson of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a
preliminary injunction to stay the application of Proposition 209 on the
grounds that the challengers had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their
claim that Proposition 209 violated the Equal Protection Clause by imposing
an unfair political process burden on minority interests and thereby violating

the Hunter Doctrine.20 However, the Ninth Circuit eventually determined that
Proposition 209 did not violate the Hunter Doctrine or the federal
constitution's Equal Protection Clause, and dissolved the preliminary
injunction. 21 A full discussion of Proposition 209, now Section 31 of the
22
California Constitution, 2 is beyond the scope of this Article, but some
references provide useful context for this discussion of CRECNO.23
One dominant effect of the implementation of Proposition 209 was the

abolition of affirmative action in the enumerated state operations. Thus, in
California, state educational institutions can no longer use affirmative action
in admissions decisions, state employers cannot practice affirmative action in
hiring decisions, and state procurement officers cannot consider minority set-

asides or minority participation levels as a factor in awarding public
contracts. 24 Section 31 has had no substantial effect on discrimination,
because while it also reiterated that the state should not discriminate, existing
25
Soon thereafter, voters in the
law already prohibited such discrimination.
State of Washington approved a similar measure,26 as did the governor in
Florida2 7 and legislators in Texas.28

19. Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999);
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997); Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v.
City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000); Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001).
20. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393-95 (1969); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson,
946 F. Supp. 1480, 1500 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The Hunter Doctrine is explained in detail infra Part IV.
21. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1448 (9th Cir. 1997).
22. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
23. For a comprehensive discussion of Proposition 209 and its implications, see, e.g., Girardeau
A. Spann, Proposition209, 47 DuKE L.J. 187, 195 (1997) (suggesting that Proposition 209 should be
subject to heightened scrutiny "as either an affirmative action program for white males or an act of
intentional discrimination under Washington v. Davis").
24. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
25. Id. art. I, § 7.
26. See, e.g., Washington's Initiative 200 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400
(West 2002)).
27. See Fla. Exec. Order 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999); Governor Bush's One Florida Initiative, at
http://www.oneflorida.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
28. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (Vernon 2000).
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Some of the proponents of Proposition 20929 and Washington's Initiative
200 then decided to take their victory one step further, drafting the Racial
Privacy Initiative and soliciting signatures to place this initiative on the
November 2002 ballot.30 The Attorney General's Office changed the name of

the initiative to the more descriptive CRECNO and set it for placement on the
ballot in the next statewide election, which was scheduled for March 2004. 3 1
In the summer of 2003, the Grutter32 decision reinvigorated Connerly and

others to begin the task of collecting signatures to bring an initiative modeled
after Proposition 209 to the voters of Michigan.

CRECNO appeared on the October ballot as Proposition 54.34 Voters
defeated Proposition 54 with 38% voting to approve the initiative and 62%
voting against it. 3 5 Though Proposition 54 was not successful in large part

due to the incompleteness and ambiguity of some of its exemptions, the
underlying prohibition is still a matter of fierce debate.
Undaunted,
supporters of Proposition 54 have indicated their desire to "try again" perhaps
with a broader health care exemption. For instance, within days after the
election, Ward Connerly told reporters that he planned to put a similar

29. Note also that Proposition 209 proponent Tom Wood did not support CRECNO. See, e.g.,
Tom Wood, The Ideology of the Racial Privacy Initiative, at www.aadap.org/ideology.htm (last
visited June 27, 2003) (on file with author).
30. See Press Release, ACLU, So-called "Racial Privacy" Initiative Will Fail to Qualify
for November 2002 Ballot (May 30, 2002) at http://www.aclunc.org/pressrel/020530-connerly.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
31. Jeff Blum, Guest Opinion:Proposition54 Makes Me Sing the Blindfold Blues, PALO ALTO
WEEKLY, Aug. 20, 2003, available at http://www.paloaltoonline.com/weekly/morgue/2003/200308
_20.guest20blum.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
32. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
33. See, e.g., Joel Kurth, Voters May Decide Affirmative Action: Activist Connerly to Launch
Mich. Initiativeto Put U-M Policies on Ballot in Nov. 2004, DETROIT NEWS, July 3, 2003.
34. See Official Voter Information Guide, California Statewide Special Election, October 2003,
at http://vote2003.ss.ca.gov/propositions/2-3-prop-54.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
In the
meantime, the financial health of the State of California deteriorated, and concerned citizens began
soliciting signatures in support of an election to recall then-Governor Gray Davis. Sufficient
signatures were gathered and verified, and the announcement was made that the recall election would
be held on October 7, 2003. Joe Mathews, The Keys to Recall Vote? No One Can Sayfor Sure, L.A.
TIMES, July 27, 2003, at Al. With an October election being the next statewide election, a debate
began as to whether CRECNO should be included on the October ballot or whether it should remain
scheduled for the March 2004 presidential primary election. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Law and
Logic Should Delay Measure on Race, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at B17 (noting that there are
different definitions in the Elections Code for recall, general, and special elections, and that
propositions can be considered only in general and special elections because recall and replacement
are the only issues permitted to be included on a recall ballot). As expected, court challenges were
launched and defeated.
35. See Commentary, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 9. 2003, at editorial page.
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proposition, reworded to address health care concerns, on the ballot in 2006.36
Given the aftermath of Proposition 209, it is also likely that a modified
version of this initiative will be proposed in other states as well.
III.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT OF CRECNO

Given the potential impact of future CRECNO legislation, it is important
to understand the scope of CRECNO as it appeared on the California ballot,
its strengths, and its weaknesses. Thus, Part III provides a critical analysis of
the operating language, definitions, scope, and exemptions to this proposed
legislation.
A.

The OperatingLanguage of the Initiative

By its broad language, CRECNO would prohibit all race, ethnicity, color,
and national origin ("Recno") classifications in all state operations. 37 It
accomplishes this prohibition in two stages. First, CRECNO explicitly bans
such Recno classifications in the three enumerated state operations.
Subsection (a) explicitly states that "[t]he State shall not classify any
individual by race, ethnicity, color, or national origin in the operation of
public education, public contracting, or public employment., 3 8 Current
California law prohibits seeking race information from those applying for
employment 39 but permits maintaining ethnic statistics on those who become
actual employees if those statistics are gathered subsequent to any hiring
decision and safeguards are in place to prevent misuse of the data.40 In
addition, current law permits the collection of data on the race and ethnicity of
current public school students4 1 and of public contractors who are actually
awarded state contracting jobs.42
CRECNO further prohibits such classifications in "any other state
operations, ' ' 3 unless three criteria are met. Subsection (b) states:
The State shall not classify any individual by race, ethnicity, color, or
national origin in the operation of any other state operations, unless
the Legislature specifically determines that said classification serves

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.; see also If Prop. 54 Fails..., SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 7, 2003, at A15.
Proposition 54.
Id. § 32(a).
See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8310 (West 1992).
See, e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE § 19704 (West 1994).
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52052 (West 2002).
CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10116(a) (West 2004).
Proposition 54 § 32(b).
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a compelling state interest and approves said classification by a twothirds majority in both houses of the Legislature, and said
classification is subsequently approved by the Governor.44
Those "other state operations" include taxing, welfare, insurance, public
buildings, libraries, courts, the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"),
records of births, deaths, and marriages, the state lottery, transportation,
veterans and national guard affairs, Parks and Recreation departments, and
various professional regulations. 45 In addition, law enforcement 46 and health
programs 47 would also be subject to the three criteria of subsection (b).
Thus, the state may classify persons by race in other state operations only
where: 1) the legislature determines that the classification serves a compelling
state interest, 2) both houses approve the classification by a two-thirds
majority, and 3) the governor then also approves the classification. Hence, no
classification can be made without substantial approval from two of the three
branches of state government. This restriction, while not as stringent as an
absolute prohibition on future legislation in this area, effectively places a
substantial roadblock against those who would seek to classify persons on
only a Recno basis, regardless of the reason, remedial or otherwise, for the
classification.4 8 It is important to recognize that a simple majority is required
to pass most legislation, and that a two-thirds vote is reserved for more serious
measures, including to override a governor's veto, to approve legislation
requiring financial appropriations, and other specified categories of
legislation. 49 Obtaining a two-thirds vote on a controversial measure is
exceedingly difficult, as California's recent budget crisis demonstrates.5 °

44. Id.
45. See, e.g., http://www.ca.gov/state/portal/myca-homepage.jsp (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
46. Except for employment, which falls under subsection (a), and profiling, which is excluded
under subsection (g).
47. Except for employment, which also falls under subsection (a), and research, which is
permitted under subsection (0.
48. See infra Part IV.G (discussing roadblocks and mere repeals); see also Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
49. See, e.g.,
California State Senate, Standing Rules of the Assembly, at
http://www.sen.ca.gov/-newsen/schedules/asmrul.htp (last visited Oct. 1, 2004); California State
Senate, Standing Rules of the Senate, at http://www.sen.ca.gov/-newsen/schedules/senrul.htp (last
visited Oct. 1, 2004); California State Senate, Joint Rules of the Senate and Assembly, at
http://www.sen.ca.gov/-newsen/schedules/Jointrul.htp (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
50. Reinventing California:Primedfor Fiscal Overhaul, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at M4
(noting the burden of the two-thirds requirement in the budgetary process).
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B. The Defined Terms

CRECNO defines its crucial terms; however, the definitions do not
provide substantial guidance in interpreting its provisions. Therefore, some
statutory interpretation is necessary to better comprehend the scope of
CRECNO. There are three steps to statutory interpretation: examining the
actual definitions and ordinary meanings of the statutory terms, referring to
the legislative history if needed, and finally, applying reason and common
sense, recognizing that one should proceed to this step only when the prior
step has failed to resolve the ambiguity.5 1 With these principles in mind, we
first examine the language of CRECNO.
Applying the first step of the statutory interpretation process reveals some
definitions. Subsection (c) states that classifying "shall be defined as the act
of separating, sorting, or organizing by race, ethnicity, color, or national
origin, including, but not limited to, inquiring, profiling, or collecting such
data on government forms.' '52

It is interesting to note that the term

"classifying" does not otherwise appear in the proposition, and thus "classify"
would have been the appropriate term to define. Nevertheless, we can further
analyze this definition by defining its terms. To "separate" means to
54
segregate; 53 to "sort" means to separate according to a classification scheme,
and "organizing" takes that task one step further by separating into a useful
classification scheme. 55 "Inquiring" means asking or seeking information
about a subject. 56 "Classifications" are acts that separate, sort, organize,

51. U.D. Registry, Inc. v. Mun. Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788 (1996).
First, a court should examine the actual language of the statute.... In examining the
language, the courts should give to the words of the statute their ordinary, everyday

meaning unless, of course, the statute itself specifically defines those words to give them a
special meaning. If the meaning is without ambiguity, doubt, or uncertainty, then the
language controls. There is nothing to 'interpret' or 'construe.' But if the meaning of the
words is not clear, courts must take the second step and refer to the legislative history. The
final step-and one which we believe should only be taken when the first two steps have
failed to reveal clear meaning-is to apply reason, practicality, and common sense to the
language at hand.
Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
52. Proposition 54 § 32(c).
53. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2069 (2002)
(defining "separate" as "to set or keep apart.., to block off: SEGREGATE").
54. Id. at 2174 (defining "sort" as "to put in a certain place or rank according to kind, class, or
nature ... to arrange according to characteristics").
55. Id. at 1590 (defining "organize" as to put in a certain place or rank according to kind, class,
or nature... to arrange according to characteristics: CLASSIFY").
56. Id. at 1167 (defining "inquire" as "to ask about... to search into.., to put a question...
seek for information by questioning").
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inquire, profile, or collect data according to Recno. This language may lead
to ambiguities because it is unclear; for instance, whether receiving
unsolicited racial or ethnic information would be considered "collecting"
under subsection (c) 57 or whether identifying a person's race would constitute
an impermissible "sorting" or "organizing" remains uncertain. The language
of the initiative is not exhaustive, however, and thus does not limit the term
"classification" to verbs included on this list. Thus it is possible that the
involuntary receipt of information could also violate CRECNO.
Subsection (d) defines the term "individual" in two different ways,
depending upon whether an enumerated state operation is at issue.58 When
addressing enumerated state operations, "individual" is clearly defined as
"current or prospective students, contractors, or employees., 59 CRECNO
focuses on the person, prohibiting the state from classifying only those people
who are current or prospective students, employees, or contractors.60
However, when addressing all other state operations, the term "individual"
refers to "persons subject to the state operations referred to in subdivision
(b).",6 1 The important distinction in these two definitions is in the use of the
phrase "current or prospective." 62
Current students, contractors, and
employees are subject to, respectively, the state operations of education,
contracting, and employment. Thus the "subject to" definition makes sense
for all state operations.
Interpreting the language requires giving meaning to variations in
phrasing within the various definitions, and thus the next inquiry is whether
being "subject to" in other state operations amounts to anything different from
"current or prospective users" of the enumerated state operations. For most of
the other state operations, one becomes subject to the state operation when
one attempts to do some act within the parameters of that agency or
department's mandate. For instance, one becomes "subject to" the DMV only
when one begins to drive or attempts to get a state identification card but
remains subject to the DMV thereafter. Therefore, in a post-CRECNO state,
the DMV would not be able to classify people with driver's licenses based on

57. Proposition 54 § 32(c).
58. Id.§ 32(d).

59. Id.
60. In contrast, section 31 does not contain a definition of "individual," and its prohibitions
apply more broadly to "any individual or group" in the enumerated state operations. CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 3 1. Thus, the prohibition of section 3 1 is more process oriented, focusing on preventing
preferences in the performance of the enumerated state operations, as opposed to defining the class of
persons subject to the state operation.
61. Proposition 54 § 32(d).
62. Id
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Recno. Similarly, one is subject to the state income tax system when one
earns a certain level of income but not before. The state then could not
classify taxpayers based on Recno in a post-CRECNO state. These two
limitations are not very troublesome, but the next one illustrates the potential
absurdity of CRECNO. Private litigants seeking to bring discrimination
claims before the Fair Employment and Housing Commission could be
considered "subject to" that state agency at the time that they bring their
claims and therefore could not be "classified" according to Recno, which
means that claimants would be unable to demonstrate membership in a
protected class.6 3 Interestingly, the defendants would also be unable to
demonstrate such membership.
This argument can be extended to suggest that each individual within the
state is a prospective user of all of the state operations because at some point
that individual may do an act which makes her subject to a particular state
operation. Under this rationale, the "subject to" phrase would seem to mean
the same as "current or possibly prospective," as long as "prospective" has an
exceedingly broad time frame. Thus it appears that any difference in these
two definitions depends upon whether there is a time limit implicit in the
definition of "prospective."
The next step in the statutory interpretation analysis is to examine the
legislative intent, which, for propositions, includes the voter information or
ballot pamphlet. 64 That pamphlet, however, does not provide any information
to help us discern
the importance of the difference between "subject to" and
"prospective." 65
In continuing to follow the rules of interpretation, the plain language of
the proposition beckons us to consider the ordinary, everyday meaning of the
term "prospective." "Prospective" is defined as "[e]ffective or operative in
the future.,66 Earlier editions of Black's Law Dictionary defined the term as
"[l]ooking forward; contemplating the future. 6 7 Thus the term "potential" is
often associated with the definition of "prospective." 68 "Intent" to engage in
63. See infra Part III.C. 1 (discussing the Department of Fair Employment and Housing).
64. See, e.g., Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
65. See Official Voter Information Guide, California Statewide Special Election, October 2003,
Analysis of Proposition 54, at http://vote2003.ss.ca.gov/propositions/2-3-1-analysis.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004).
66. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (7th ed. 1999); see also State v. Martin, 822 So. 2d 153,
154 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (New Pocket ed. 1996)).
67. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1386 (4th ed.); see also Morrow v. State, 862 S.W. 2d 612,
614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
68. See, e.g., Philadelphia Plaza-Phase II v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc., No. 332,
2002 WL 1472338, at *5 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 30, 2002) ("A prospective contractual relation is
'something less than a contractual right, something more than mere hope,' although the term
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conduct is also included within the definition of prospective in the analysis of
standing issues.6 9
Based on these definitions, it would seem that California courts will need
to develop a test to determine when an individual is a prospective student,
employee, or contractor. Such a test may include requiring an intent to enroll,
become employed, or bid on a state contracting job, coupled with a reasonable
likelihood of realizing that intent, but would fall short of requiring an
application or bid proposal. A current applicant or bidder would easily satisfy
the test, as would a high school student intending to apply to college in the
following year. A junior-high student who once visited the UCLA campus
and expressed hopes of someday attending would be a tough case, and it is
unlikely that my six-year-old, despite his current expressions of interest,
would meet the requirements of this test. The courts also will need to develop
a test to determine the parameters of the phrase "subject to." In the meantime,
CRECNO's definitions of these terms will remain unclear, which could result
in uneven application of the prohibitions in a post-CRECNO state.
Subsection (k) provides a definition of the "State":
For purposes of this section, "State" shall include, but not necessarily be
limited to, the State itself, any city, county, city and county, public
university system, including the University of California, California State
University, community college district, school district, special district, or
subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or
any other political
70
within the State.
State agencies would be included within the phrase "governmental
instrumentality.",7 1 This definition is modeled after Article I, Section 31(f) of
the California Constitution; 72 the only difference is that CRECNO includes a
admittedly 'has an evasive quality, eluding precise definition."' (quoting Thompson Coal v. Pike
Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. 1979))).
69. See, e.g., Beztak Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 298 F.3d. 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2002) (reasoning
that a prospective developer must demonstrate an "intent to develop and operate a casino," in order to
establish standing to challenge the selection process); see also Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General
Motors Corp., 682 F. Supp. 873, 878 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (stating that a prospective relationship "at the
very least," requires "that at the time of the conduct complained of, there was a reasonable likelihood
that the relationship would come into existence").
70. Proposition 54 § 32(k).
71. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) ("It has long been settled that
the reference to actions 'against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a
State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state
instrumentalities.") (citations omitted).
72. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (f).
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specific reference to the "California State University" system in the "but not
limited to" listing.73 It is not clear why this system was specifically identified
here, but it was likely an attempt to further disseminate the effects of
Proposition 209 by clearing up any ambiguity over whether that state
university system is also subject to its mandate.
C. The Exemptions to the Rule

CRECNO contains several exemptions from the classification ban.74
These exemptions seem to serve three main purposes. First, some of the
exemptions would help to ensure that the initiative is not found to be
unconstitutional or fatally in conflict with federal law upon its initial review. 75
This was a successful strategy used in the wording of Proposition 209,76 and
the drafters have learned even more since that time. The second purpose
served by some of the exemptions is to garner additional political support by
excluding some of the common and more widely accepted uses of statistical
information.77 The third purpose is to obviate the need for the legislature and
governor to formally agree, by including what appear to be the drafters' a
priori determinations as to what should constitute a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify some continuing classifications. 78 Still, it is difficult to
discern why state regulation of private employment and housing, medical
research, law enforcement, and incarceration issues are all "worthy" of being
exemptions to the terms of this initiative, while other aspects of state
operations are required to seek legislative and executive approval in advance.
Moreover, it would logically seem that all of the exemptions should fulfill this
third purpose by serving sufficiently compelling interests for the initiative to
be internally consistent and defensible in its entirety. The remainder of this
Section will address each of the specific exemptions.
1. Fairness in Employment and Housing
CRECNO provides a specific but limited exemption for the Department of
The DFEH monitors
Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"). 79
discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations.8 0 The
mandate of the DFEH is modeled after Title VII, which extended
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(f); Proposition 54 § 32(k).
Proposition 54 § 32(e)-(h).
Id. § 32(i).
See, e.g., Proposition 209 § 31(d), (e), (h).
See, e.g., Proposition 54 § 32(e)-(h).
Id.
Proposition 54 § 32(e).
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12930 (West 1992).
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antidiscrimination laws to private employers of a certain size and was enacted
by Congress after executive orders first began to address employment by
The DFEH "ensures compliance with and
government contractors. 8
investigates violations of state civil rights laws governing employment,
housing, public accommodations and hate crimes.... In addition, the
department's investigations of alleged violations of civil rights law often
involve using these types of data to build evidence of a pattern of
In actuality, however, there is a separate state
discrimination., 82
instrumentality that prosecutes discrimination cases and makes factual
findings on whether discrimination is proven or not in a particular case. This
state actor is the Fair Employment and Housing Commission ("FEHC").83
FEHC is not included within the exemption, and CRECNO would have
further eviscerated the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, because as
merely another state operation, FEHC would be prevented from making
factual findings that classify according to Recno without prior legislative and
executive approval. Making a prima facie case of wrongful discrimination
requires proof of being in a protected class. But because that finding cannot
be rendered by the FEHC, there will be no more prima facie cases, and thus
defendants always will prevail.
Subsection (e) of Proposition 54 states: "The Department of Fair
Employment and Housing (DFEH) shall be exempt from this section with
respect to DFEH-conducted classifications in place as of March 5, 2002. "84
The significance of the date is not entirely clear, and research has not
uncovered an explanation from the drafters. It is possible that the drafters
hoped to qualify the initiative for that election date, but more likely that they

81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-8(c)-(d) (2004).
82. Legislative Analyst's Office, Fiscal Analysis Initiatives, 3/19/01 Letter to Attorney General
Lockyer, Atty. Gen. File #: 2001-06, 11/5/01 Letter to Attorney GeneralLockyer, Atty. Gen. File #:
2001-27 at http://www.lao.ca.gov/initiatves/fiscal-letters/2001/010123 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
83. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12935(f)-(g) (West 1992), which states that the
Commission's responsibilities include:
(f) To hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, administer oaths,
examine any person under oath and, in connection therewith, to require the production of
any books or papers relating to any matter under investigation or in question before the

commission.
(g) To create or provide financial or technical assistance to such advisory agencies and
conciliation councils, local or otherwise, as in its judgment will aid in effectuating the
purposes of this part, and to empower them to study the problems of discrimination in all or
specific fields of human relationships or in particular instances of employment
discrimination on the bases enumerated in this part....
Id.
84. Proposition 54 § 32(e).
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wanted to ensure that no new classifications arose during the political debates
prior to a vote on the initiative.
The DFEH exemption seems to fit all three of CRECNO's primary
purposes. First, it is designed to avoid a conflict with federal law by
maintaining a monitoring and enforcement mechanism for antidiscrimination
laws.
To the extent that federal law requires maintaining certain
classifications, the state will continue to comply under the provisions of
subsection (i),85 and for those classifications which are not required, there will
be no actual conflict when the sunset provision becomes operative.
The DFEH exemption also serves the second purpose of being palatable to
a large group of potential voters because it suggests a recognition that some
racial and ethnic discrimination still occurs in the areas of housing and
employment. Nevertheless, it avoids being the exemption that swallows the
rule by providing a concession of limited duration: a decade of additional time
to try to remedy that unfortunate reality.86 If a decade is insufficient, then the
legislature has the ability to extend the concession period.87
Third, this exemption purports to further a compelling interest in
remedying past discrimination by permitting the DFEH to continue its
monitoring and enforcement of antidiscrimination provisions against private
companies. The exemption also seems to address the narrowly tailored prong
of the strict scrutiny test, by recognizing that these classifications may no
longer serve a compelling interest in ten years, if the need for race-based
remedies dissipates in that time period. However, upon closer scrutiny, the
existence of the sunset provision suggests an illegitimate motive-to hinder,
and perhaps outright block, effective monitoring and enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws in ten years, by using the specific limitation in the
''sunset" provision.
The sunset provision also appears to create some unnecessary ambiguity.
The sunset provision states: "(1) Unless specifically extended by the
legislature, this exemption shall expire 10 years after the effective date of this
measure." 88 Absent a legislative extension, DFEH classifications based on
Recno in any state that approves CRECNO in the year 2006 would become
unconstitutional in the year 2016.89 The phrase "unless specifically extended
85. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1606.1-1606.8 (2003).
86. See infra Part IV.H.2.
87. Proposition 54 § 32(e)(1).
88. Id.
89. Ironically, the sunset provision for the DFEH is a full fifteen years shorter than the
University of Michigan's affirmative action sunset provision, which was announced by the United
States Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
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by the legislature" 90 leads to the erroneous conclusion that such an extension
would be a relatively routine matter for the legislature. In voting in favor of
the initiative, it is logical to assume that voters would intend that the DFEH
exemptions would expire in ten years, unless the legislature, not the voters,
decided to extend the length of that exemption. From the plain language of
subsection (e), it appears that the legislature must "specifically extend" the
exemption. The section says nothing more about how this extension shall be
agreed upon, and thus statutory construction rules would suggest that the
legislature simply must vote, by a simple majority, to extend the DFEH
exemption.
However, the DFEH is not an enumerated state operation 91 because it
covers private employment, and thus the DFEH classifications must be
analyzed under subsection (b).92 While it is difficult for scholars to predict
what a future state legislature will do, subsection (b) provides a substantial
hurdle that may forestall the approval of an extension. If the legislature votes
to extend the exemption, then the DFEH's actions after the extension would
amount to "classifying," and classifications are not permitted without a twothirds vote of the legislature and the governor's approval.93 By voting to
extend the exemption, the legislature itself arguably would be classifying and
thus would need to satisfy the two-thirds vote requirement in order to extend
the DFEH exemption. Thus, while voters might assume that only a simple
legislative majority is needed to extend the DFEH classification, a plausible
argument could be made that the text of CRECNO requires both a two-thirds
legislative majority and governor approval in order to extend the DFEH
classification. Accordingly, it may be just as difficult to extend the sunset
provision as to constitutionalize a new classification. While this potential
ambiguity is not likely to render the initiative unconstitutionally vague, 94 it
would be tough to determine the voters' intent should a conflict arise.
The DFEH exemption contains a second limitation which states that
"[n]otwithstanding DFEH's exemption from this section, DFEH shall not
impute a race, color, ethnicity, or national origin to any individual. 95 Upon
first read, this limitation appeals to those supporters who believe that race
should be a private matter. In reality, however, this limitation will have at
today.").
90. Proposition 54 § 32(e)(1).
91. Id. § 32(b).
92. Id.
93. Reinventing California: Primedfor Fiscal Overhaul, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at M4
(noting the burden of the two-thirds requirement in the budgetary process).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
95. Proposition 54 § 32(e)(2).
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least three significant effects. First, during the ten-year exemption period, the
DFEH must inquire, perhaps more diligently than it currently does, to avoid
the need for imputation. For those who want to keep their racial information
private, a more diligent inquiry will be more intrusive than a silent imputation.
The second effect will be to decrease the availability of data during this
exemption period, as more and more individuals refuse to respond to the
DFEH inquiry, and as agencies that are not exempted from CRECNO stop
collecting the underlying data and thus have nothing to report to the DFEH.96
The DFEH exemption will not save future litigants because the exemption
permits only the DFEH to keep its own statistics and does not permit each
state agency or operation to maintain its own statistical records.
Because the DFEH cannot impute a race, ethnicity, color, or national
origin, "declined to state" may become the largest so-called racial group in the
private employment and housing markets.
There is no actionable
discrimination against "declined to state" because that group is not really a
race, an ethnicity, a color, or a national origin. This decrease in accurate
information will lead to the third effect: a false sense that the problem of
discrimination in housing and employment has been solved simply because
we no longer have sufficient racial, ethnic, color, or national origin data with
which to measure such discrimination. One editorial has indicated that the
DFEH exemption:
is misleading and accomplishes nothing. Because all other public
agencies would be prohibited from collecting data under the initiative,
no relevant data would exist for the DFEH to analyze and report. If
the initiative were passed, DFEH would cease to exist as an effective
monitor of97 race discrimination in employment and housing in
California.
The longer term effect of the lack of information will be an appearance
that there is no discrimination, and that there is therefore no reason for the
DFEH to continue classifying individuals; thus, there will be no need for a
legislative extension. Those voters who like the idea of phasing out these
classifications as discrimination will have been tricked as if Harry Potter's

96. Coalition for an Informed California, Fighting Hate Crime and Discrimination:
Information Equals a Commitment to Fairness and Continuing Progress (2002), at
http://www.informedcalifornia.org/hatecrime_02.shtml (last visited June 22, 2003) (on file with
author).
97. Michele Alexander, The Racial PrivacyInitiative: Ward Connerly's Latest Assault on Civil
Rights, OPINIONS, June 26, 2001, at www.aclunc.org/opinion/010626-assaultcivilrights.html (last
visited Oct. 1, 2004).
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"invisibility cloak" covered the missing statistics.98 The problem will remain,
and its effects will linger, but we will not be able to see it, measure it, or
record it. The discrimination may still be there, or it may have departed from
the state. The problem is simply that we will not know.
2. Medical Patients and Research Subjects
The initiative also provided an exemption for medical patients and
research subjects who permit the state to continue to gather Recno
information on those who are in organized research studies and those who are
receiving medical treatment.
Subsection (f) states: "Otherwise lawful
classification of medical research subjects and patients shall be exempt from
this section." 99 The terms "medical research subjects" and "patients" are not
defined in the initiative, so a court may apply common understandings of
these terms' 00 or defer to federal definitions, which define "research" as "a
systematic investigation, including research development, testing an
evaluation, designed to develop or . . . contribute to generalizable
knowledge. 10
In the California Evidence Code, a patient is defined as "a
person who consults a physician.., for the purpose of securing a diagnosis..
or ...treatment." 10 2 Any of these definitions should be sufficient.
This exclusion purports to serve the political appeal purpose by ensuring
that CRECNO will not interfere with testing and research that focuses on
health issues that disproportionately affect particular Recno groups.
Performing research categorized by Recno data allows health professionals to
identify genetic, environmental, and other factors that contribute to health
problems for different Recno groups, and this exemption will allow the health
professions to continue this research. 0 3 However, even the research data will
be less complete under this exemption because other state departments
currently collect some portions of the underlying data that is used by the
medical researchers. 0 4 The lion's share of health data is not collected in the
98. ROWLING, supra note 2, at 201-02. Invisibility cloak is a magic cloak that grants the
wearer invisibility. Id.
99. Proposition 54 § 32(f).
100. U.D. Registry, Inc. v. Municipal Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 790 (Ct. App. 1996).
101. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d).
102. CAL. EVID. CODE § 991 (West 1995).
103. Coalition for an Informed California, supra note 96.
104. See National Lawyers Guild Fact Sheet on Connerly's Initiative (2002), at
http://www.aclunc.org/connerly initiative/nlgfactsheet.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) [hereinafter
National Lawyers Guild Fact Sheet]. For instance, studies show that race, not income, can be the
determining factor for the severity of many environmental hazards.
Many studies show that environmental hazards, ranging from living near toxic dumps or
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areas of public education, employment, or contracting.' 0 5 Rather, the
departments that collect some of this data involve "other state operations,"
and thus any classifications involving individuals who were neither patients
nor research subjects would be governed by the subsection (b) requirement of
a legislative finding of a compelling governmental interest and the approval of
the governor. 0 6 In the time it takes to get such approval, no new data will be
added, and the pre-CRECNO data will become outdated. This interruption in
data gathering consequentially will increase the potential error rate for the
results of any statistical analysis based on that data and make it virtually
impossible to do any effective targeting of the communities most at risk.
To the extent that state departments such as the Department of Finance are
collecting this data on individuals who can be properly categorized as
research subjects or patients, it is likely that this collection will be considered
"otherwise lawful" and thus can continue pursuant to this exemption.
However, the mere collection of data does not make one a patient or a
research subject. Moreover, where the purpose of data collection is to protect
from or control disease in a community, that person is not considered to be a
research subject. Therefore, CRECNO does not exempt such information
gathering from its racial prohibitions.
The larger fallacy in the research protection argument is evident when
researchers try to put the results of their work to effective use. One of the
most important benefits of medical research is to promote the prevention of
disease, and opponents of CRECNO stated that the "one size fits all"
approach to health care does not work because the professionals need to target
10 7
particular racial communities with educational campaigns tailored to them.
This was an effective political argument that contributed greatly to
other polluting facilities, breathing unhealthy air, suffering from childhood lead poisoning
or pesticide-related illnesses, or eating contaminated fish, are disproportionately
concentrated in minority communities, and that race, not income or education or other
factors, is the most important reason for this. Some of the most important demographic
data on which these studies are based comes from the California Department of Finance,
the Department of Health, and County Health Departments, and could no longer be
collected if the RPI were enacted into law.
Id.
105. Id.
106. Proposition 54 § 32(b).
107. National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter, Stop Ward Connerly's "Race
Infonnation Ban," at www.nlg.org/sf/rpi.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) (citing different rates of
diseases/health problems for different racial groups); National Lawyers Guild Fact Sheet, supra note
104 ( "A fundamental principle of public health is to look at demographic data, including age, sex,
race and ethnicity, to determine what causes illnesses and how to prevent them. Without this
information, public health professionals won't know where to target their prevention, education,
outreach, and research efforts.").
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CRECNO's October defeat. The limitation of this exemption to permit
classifying only patients and research subjects means that the results of the
research cannot be effectively disseminated to the appropriate target audience
of potential patients-those most at risk-because membership in that target
community depends on environment, conduct, and also Recno. Because the
community is not a patient or research subject, CRECNO does not permit the
classification of those communities by Recno, the critical missing piece of the
analysis. Thus, the "target audience" for the research results-the community
most at risk-will not be identifiable without resorting to impermissible
Recno classifications.
The state has a legitimate and important interest in maintaining statistical
08
data from health records, but the interest is difficult to define.'
Discriminatory practices were curtailed as antidiscrimination laws evolved
and monitoring mechanisms were introduced. CRECNO opponents recognize
that "when you monitor behavior, you modify behavior."' 1 9 The opponents of
CRECNO would likely define the interest as a compelling interest in
providing meaningful public health data, which requires taking into
consideration all relevant factors, including Recno. But monitoring still
implicates the need for effective dissemination of the data, which this
exemption does not permit. Thus, it is likely that this exemption serves only a
partially compelling governmental interest and needs to be expanded to serve
that interest more effectively.
3. The Law Enforcement Exemptions
Subsections (g) and (h) provide some additional exemptions in the law
enforcement context. Subsection (g) states: "Nothing in this section shall
prevent law enforcement officers, while carrying out their law enforcement
duties, from describing particular persons in otherwise lawful ways," and that
the governor, legislature, or agencies cannot "require [them] to maintain
records that track individuals on the basis of said classifications," nor
withhold funding from the law enforcement agencies "on the basis of the
failure to maintain such records."" 0 This exemption permits the police to
give a description of a suspect, but when read in conjunction with subsection
(c), prohibits the officers from inquiring about Recno because such an inquiry
108. Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 38 (Ct. App. 2001). The Connerly court
reasoned that "portions of the statutory scheme that provide for data collection and reporting do not
suffer a constitutional defect because a determination of the underutilization of minorities and
women in state service can serve legitimate and important purposes." Id.
109. Quote from panelist Brian Smedley, Senior Program Officer, Division of Health Services
Policy, at the Colorblind Racism Conference, Oct. 3, 2003, in Palo Alto, California.
110. Proposition 54 § 32(g).
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constitutes a "classification" in violation of subsection (b)."' Why prevent
the law enforcement officers from inquiring? Perhaps because the prohibition
seems more politically palatable and can be billed as an antiprofiling
component. However, it seems that most profiling is based on color, or
features associated with race, ethnicity, and national origin, and not on
knowing the actual race, ethnicity, or national origin. So this cleverly worded
nothing to lessen the most common
(or not so?) phrase actually 1does
12
manifestations of such profiling.
Subsection (g) also states that:
[n]either the Governor, the Legislature nor any statewide agency shall
require law enforcement officers to maintain records that track individuals
on the basis of said classifications, nor shall the Governor, the
enforcement
Legislature, or any statewide agency withhold funding to law
1 13
records.
such
maintain
to
failure
the
of
basis
the
agencies on
This language leaves open the possibility for the courts to mandate such
records and thus serves to avoid any potential conflict with consent decrees
and other monitoring requirements. However, it also prevents any new
monitoring of police profiling and of accountability for any resulting
disparities.
In evaluating its purposes, the law enforcement exemption does not seem
an issue of avoiding conflict with federal law; however, on its face
address
to

111. Id. § 32(b).
112. Imagine the end of the slippery slope, and the unlikely, though possible, conversation
between a witness and a police officer:
"Describe the person you saw running away."
Police Officer:
"He was tall and big, and running pretty fast."
Witness:
"Anything else you can think of? Any other feature that might help us
Police Officer:
narrow this down a bit?"
"Like what?"
Witness:
"Well, anything at all, close your eyes and picture him. What did he
Police Officer:
really look like?"

"Ooh do you mean like if he was black or white?"
"According to the recent state constitutional amendment, police officers
are not permitted to inquire about the race of potential suspects or
perpetrators, but if you just tell me what you saw, I can use it."
"I understand, officer. The guy running away was (race) or (ethnicity),
Witness:
had (color) skin and looked like he was from (national origin)."
And the witness imputes a race or an ethnicity, describes a color and infers a national origin. Is
this the type of exchange that the exemption seeks to foster?
113. Proposition 54 § 32(g).
Witness:
Police Officer:
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at least, it has some political appeal. In addition, its proponents may argue
that this subsection protects a compelling interest involving public safety,
crime detection, and arrests. If these are compelling interests, then continuing
to classify the individuals would result in more effective law enforcement
when the witness is looking through so-called "mug shot" books of people in
the system to search for a potential suspect. Yet, under subsection (b), the
police may not separate, sort, or classify the books by Recno. 114 Neither may
the police inquire about Recno from witnesses. 115 Yet the officers may
continue to use Recno in their own descriptions of the suspects and in their
investigations and processing of information, so they can pass along what the
witness says or what they themselves observed in their investigations and
processing of information. Thus, the exemption incompletely and somewhat
ineffectively serves these purported government interests.
Subsection (h) provides a further exemption for prisoners and undercover
agents, stating, "Otherwise lawful assignment of prisoners and undercover
law enforcement officers shall be exempt from this section."'1 16 The rationale
for this exemption seems to be to lessen the possibility of prison riots and to
avoid being wholly ineffective in undercover operations. Neither of these
rationales seems to have strong political appeal, unless a police officers' union
is likely to be a big supporter.1 17 This exemption also might be deemed to
serve a compelling interest in public safety, if broadly defined. However, the
interest it really serves is more narrow-safety of prisoners and law
enforcement officers. One scholar has noted a troubling dichotomy, stating
"[I]t is quite curious how racial classification is permissible in criminal
repression of people of color [the prison context] by law enforcement, but
impermissible when it legitimately questions law enforcement conduct [the
racial profiling context]."' 1 8 Nevertheless, it seems like the kind of measure
that eventually would gamer support of two-thirds of the legislature and the
governor, and thus, perhaps this explicit statement of the exemption in the text
of the initiative is appropriate.

114. Proposition 54 § 32(b).
115. Id
116. Id. § 32(h).
117. This support was not evident in California: "Prop 54 is opposed by law enforcement
groups, Attorney General Bill Lockyear, Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca, as well as Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs throughout California and the California Professional Firefighters and the
California State Firefighters Association." Coalition for an Informed California, The Dangers of
Prop. 54: An Overview, (2003), at http://www.informedcalifornia.org/healthcare_01.shtml (last
visited June 20, 2003) (on file with author).
118. Maurice R. Dyson, Multiracial Identity, Monoracial Authenticity & Racial Privacy:
Toward an Adequate Theory ofMultiracialResistance, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 394 (2004).
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D. General Provisionsof the Initiative

The clear purpose of Subsection (i) is to avoid a conflict with federal
law.' 9 It states: "Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting
action which must be taken to comply with federal law, or establish or
maintain eligibility for any federal program, where ineligibility would result
in a loss of federal funds to the State."' 20 This provision is cleverly worded
because it does not affect actions which may, but are not required to be taken,
under federal law, and thus is a slight improvement on the language of Section
31 of the California Constitution, which states, "[n]othing in this section shall
be interpreted as prohibiting action which must be taken to establish or
maintain any federal program, where ineligibility would result in a loss of
federal funds to the state.''
The CRECNO drafters likely added the
"comply with federal law" language to avoid a facial conflict argument. 122
Subsection (j)
also is modeled after a provision of section 31. It states that
"[n]othing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any valid consent
decree or court order which is in force as of the effective date of this
section."' 123 The only modification from the section 31 language is the
addition of the word "valid" and the switching of the positions of the phrases
"consent decree" and "court order."' 24 Thus, police agencies under such
orders125 will be exempt from CRECNO and still will be required to maintain
the statistical records. The purpose is to avoid a conflict with federal or other
state laws.
126
Subsection (in) states that the initiative is self-executing and severable.
If there is a conflict, then the provisions of CRECNO shall be enforced to the
maximum that the Constitution and federal law permit. This subsection uses
the exact language from Proposition 209.127 Again, this language is now
standard phrasing and its use mitigates the likelihood of a fatal conflict with
federal law destroying the initiative in its entirety.
The foregoing discussion provides an analysis of the text of the initiative,
its scope, ambiguities, and exemptions, and is intended as a blueprint for a
discussion of Recno legislation in the future political debate when the

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Proposition 54 § 32(i).
Id.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (e).
Proposition 54 § 32(i).
Id.§ 32(0).
Id.; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
See, e.g., U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002).
Proposition 54 § 32(m).
See id.; Proposition 209 § 31(h).
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modified version of CRECNO next appears.
IV. Do PORTIONS OF CRECNO VIOLATE THE HUNTER DOCTRINE?
If enacted, CRECNO could be determined to violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution because the state enacting the
legislation would be providing less than equal protection to people of color
within its boundaries by erecting additional political barriers, in violation of
the Hunter Doctrine. 28 The political barrier here would make it illegal to
classify, sort, or collect racial data in state operations.
Thus, while
discrimination still would be outlawed, that state's laws will be rendered
virtually ineffective, at least in the areas of monitoring and enforcing fair
housing and fair employment laws. Fewer discriminators will be prosecuted
because the pool of available proof will shrink considerably when the state
agencies are prohibited from collecting racial data. Because CRECNO
expressly prohibits racial classifications, it may appear on the surface that
CRECNO cannot be discriminatory on the basis of race. Upon deeper
reflection, it becomes evident that this apparently neutral law imposes, and in
fact was intended to impose, special burdens on racial and ethnic minorities
who seek to vindicate their federally protected rights in both the courts and
through the state legislature. 29 Of course there is an important constitutional
difference between laws that in fact burden minority interests and laws that
were intended to burden minority interests. The former are actionable under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but do not violate the Constitution
under traditional equal protection analysis. 30 However, the United States
Supreme Court's decisions on the political structure component of equal
protection, known as the Hunter Doctrine, does not resolve the question of
3
whether intent is required. ' '
A. The Development of the HunterDoctrine
The Constitution of the United States provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

128.
129.
130.
131.

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
Thanks to my colleague Bob Pushaw for advice in clarifying this point.
Hunter, 393 U.S. 385.
Id.
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'13 2
protection of the laws."

The last phrase, the "Equal Protection Clause," provides the foundation for
antidiscrimination laws, and its "central purpose... is the prevention of
on
the
basis
of
race.' 3 3
official
conduct
discriminating
In the early days of the Equal Protection Clause, the focus was on
eradicating facially discriminatory laws, those that explicitly classified
134
according to race and contained separate rules for whites and nonwhites.
As the notion of racial equality gained more ground, the next battlefront was
to address laws that were facially race-neutral, but still operated to
discriminate based on race. 35 Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, federal
legislation was enacted, seeking to bridge the gap between conduct prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment and other methods of discrimination that did
not violate the federal constitution. 136 For instance, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, enacted under the Commerce Clause, provides that it is an
unlawful employment practice for any employer "to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
because of such
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
137
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."'
As one component of the debate over facial neutrality and discriminatory
impact, civil rights litigators challenged laws that appeared to be race-neutral
but actually resulted in a more substantial burden for minority voters or voters
seeking to protect minority interests. These advocates found success in the
case of Reitman v. Mulkey.'3 1 In Reitman, California voters adopted an
amendment to the California Constitution that prohibited the state from
interfering with the absolute discretion of private landowners to decline to
transfer real property to whomever they chose. 139 Because the amendment

132.
133.
134.
135.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
See, e. g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886):

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material
to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id.
136.
137.
138.
139.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Id.
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changed the situation from restricting against discrimination to prohibiting
restrictions on discrimination, the court found that the amendment "was
intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing
market." 140 More than merely repealing existing antidiscrimination laws, the
amendment encouraged private14 1discrimination and amounted to a "repeal in
advance" of fair housing laws.
A similar issue was presented in Otey v. Common Council,142 where the
district court determined that a resolution to prevent a government council
from enacting fair housing legislation for two years would "give statutory
sanction to those who wish to discriminate without interference" and "would
significantly involve the City in private discrimination and unquestionably
encourage such discrimination, and it therefore constitutes State action
144
143
Then, in Hunter v. Erickson,
proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment."'
the city council enacted a fair housing ordinance, and the voters approved a
referendum to amend the city charter such that any future ordinance barring
racial discrimination in housing would have to be approved by the city council
and a majority of the city's voters before it could be enacted.1 45 The
challengers argued that the referendum violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it was an official action that operated to discriminate against those
who seek fair housing laws. Because those who seek fair housing laws are
more likely to be racial minorities, the referendum made it more difficult for
voters of color to obtain redress in the political process. 146 All other housing
matters, including those that did not address racial discrimination, remained
subject to the former process and thus were more easily enacted. The court
found that this change in procedures for enacting antidiscrimination
ordinances was not a neutral restructuring of the political process because
people of color had a more difficult time obtaining fair legislation in their
interest.147 The United States Supreme Court, relying on Reitman, reasoned
that the change in the political process to require both the city council and the
voters to approve only those ordinances dealing with prohibiting
discrimination in housing provided a new and different process for passing

140. Id. at 381.
141. Keith E. Sealing, Proposition209 as Proposition14 (as Amendment 2): The Unremarked
Death of PoliticalStructureEqual Protection, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 337, 344 (1999).
142. 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
143. Id. at 273.
144. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
145. Id. at 387.
146. Id. at 391.
147. Id.
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ordinances related to racially fair housing. 148 The Supreme Court determined
that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated because "the reality is that the
law's impact falls on the minority," and the law thereby denied voters of color
their right to equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 149 This rule of law became known as the Hunter Doctrine.
The Supreme Court revisited the Hunter Doctrine in another case of
facially neutral legislation with a disproportionate impact on people of color.
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,150 the voters adopted a
statewide initiative that prohibited school boards from assigning students to
schools outside of their neighborhood unless a specific exemption applied.
There were numerous specific exemptions, such that the only remaining
impermissible basis for selecting students' schooling assignments was that of
racial desegregation. 151 The district court found that the initiative was
unconstitutional because it violated the Hunter Doctrine. 152 The Supreme
Court recognized that a law can violate the Equal Protection Clause when the
political structure appears to treat individuals equally, "yet more subtly
distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens on
the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation."' 153 When the
state is "explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the
decision making process," 154 then minority groups are especially burdened by
the legislation. In Washington v. Seattle, the Court found that the initiative
violated the Constitution because it "use[d] the racial nature of an issue to
define the governmental decision making structure, and thus impose[d]
substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities."' 55 Prior to the passage
of the initiative, all schooling matters had been decided under the authority
and discretion of the local school board. Then the initiative separated out the
issue of desegregative busing, which became the only issue that was no longer
decided by the local school board. The majority of the voters statewide had
decided that desegregative busing no longer was an acceptable price to pay to
hasten desegregation efforts, and those students still attending largely
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political
Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1996). All other housing matters could be
decided by the former process. Similarly, subsection (a) of CRECNO permits all non-Recno
classifications in enumerated areas to be left alone, and prohibits only Recno classifications.
Proposition 54 § 32(a).
150. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 465.
153. ld. at 467.
154. Id. at 470.
155. Id.
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156
segregated schools were unable to make a change.
The Washington v. Seattle litigants also argued that the case of
Washington v. Davis157 had discredited the Hunter Doctrine. 1 8 However, the
Seattle Court specifically rejected that contention by distinguishing the
explicit use of race in Hunter from the implicit racial factors in Washington v.
Davis. 159 Soon thereafter, the United States Supreme Court faced the debate
over what was necessary to prove racial discrimination when the challenged
program or ordinance was racially neutral on its face. In the Title VII context,
the Court determined that a person may make "a claim for discriminatory
employment practices based on a showing of disparate treatment based on
race, or a showing that those practices have a racially disparate impact on
hiring or promotion of employees."'' 60 And thus the disparate treatment and
disparate impact tests were launched to adjudicate alleged violations of Title
VII.
Back in 1976, the Supreme Court had evaluated the applicability of the
Title VII jurisprudence to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Washington v. Davis,16 1 the Court determined that a disparate
racial impact is not only probative evidence of discrimination but is sufficient
under Title VII to demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination in employment. 162 However, the Court declined to extend the
rule to the Equal Protection Clause, stating, "We have never held that the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial
discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we
decline to do so today."' 163 The Court explained that disparate racial impact
"is not the sole touchstone of invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution, ' 64 and will not alone be adequate to establish a prima facie
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 165 Proof of discriminatory purpose is
required to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment test even though some portions
of that proof can be established through evidence of disparate impact.166 The

156. Id. at 480-81. The question remains: How does this voter decision meet the intent
requirement? For further discussion of this issue, see, e.g., David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 935, 981 (1989).
157. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
158. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484-87 (1982).
159. Id. at485.
160. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
161. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 239.
164. Id. at 242.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 244-45 (stating that "to the extent that those cases rested on or expressed the view
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Court recognized that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true,
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another."1' 67 One scholar has
noted that Washington v. Davis has "tamed Brown"'168 by reducing the Equal
Protection doctrine to the "minimum necessary content of Brown: that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits only explicit classifications and the
gerrymanders-facially neutral actions that are in fact
equivalent of racial
169
based on race."
Professor Charles Lawrence notes that:
[A] motive-centered doctrine of racial discrimination places a very
heavy, and often impossible, burden of persuasion on the wrong side
of the dispute. Improper motives are easy to hide. And because
behavior results from the interaction of a multitude of motives,
governmental officials will always be able 70to argue that racially
neutral considerations prompted their actions. 1
Thus, the Washington v. Davis focus on intent operates to "normalize" white
privilege by forcing litigants of color to prove the subjective intent of an
alleged discriminator, thus increasing the difficulty of stating a prima facie
case.
The Supreme Court's rationale seems to be that where the racial
classification is explicit in the terms of the legislation, the strict scrutiny
that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an equal protection
violation, we are in disagreement); but see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 adjusted the requirements to the following:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this title
only if-(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991) (abrogating
Wards Cove PackingCo.); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional,
Statutory, and PhilosophicalEnigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911 (1993); Note, The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 and Less DiscriminatoryAlternatives in Dispute Impact Litigation, 106 HARV. L. REv.
1621 (1993).
167. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (citing jury cases as an example of a
severely disproportionate impact that may "demonstrate unconstitutionality" because it is "very
difficult" to explain on nonracial grounds).
168. Strauss, supra note 156, at 954.
169. Id.
170. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987).
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analysis is appropriate, as it was in Hunter. On the other hand, Washington v.
Davis involved an implicit classification, based on the ability to pass an
employment test, and the disparate racial impact of that test on applicants, and
thus the rule announced in that case, the court seems to be saying, applies only
to other cases of implicit classifications. When a racial classification is
explicit, "regardless of purported motivation, [it] is presumptively invalid and
can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification."''
When the
classification
is
at
most
implicit,
then
the
motive
inquiry
is
necessary,
as in
72
Seattle.'
In a companion case to Seattle, the Court rejected a Hunter Doctrine
claim. In Crawford v. Board of Education,173 the California voters adopted a
constitutional amendment to limit desegregative busing to only those
instances where such busing would be ordered under federal law; that is, to
remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 174 The petitioners argued
that this state constitutional amendment violated the federal constitution by
truncating the ability to desegregate the public schools. 17 5 The respondents
argued that the amendment did not involve a racial classification, given that it
applied generally to "pupil school assignment" and "pupil busing."' 76 The
court determined that the state constitutional amendment coincided exactly
with the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment because the only limitation was
on additional busing, above and beyond what would be required as a remedy
for past discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 77 Because the
State of California was merely stepping back its remedies to no longer provide
some measure of additional protection against discrimination, the Court
78
determined that there was no violation of the Federal Constitution.1

171. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982) (quoting Pers. Admin. of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)).
172. Id. at 485-86.
173. 458 U.S. 527 (1982). The Crawford Court recognized that "the Hunter Court noted that
although 'the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner,' a
charter amendment making it more difficult to pass antidiscrimination legislation could only
disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental process." Id. at 541 n.26 (quoting Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (holding that the state constitutional amendment did not employ
a racial classification, where the amendment limited state court ordered busing for desegregation
purposes to situations under which a federal court would order such busing)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 538 n.18.
177. Id. at 542 ("In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution, the
state was free to return in part to the standard prevailing generally throughout the United States.").
178. Id. ("That it chose to pull back only in part, and by preserving a greater right to
desegregation than exists under the Federal Constitution, most assuredly does not render the
Proposition unconstitutional on its face.").
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Thus, the Court determined that there was no Hunter Doctrine violation
because the rights that were taken away through this new political process
were those that exceeded the minimum requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause. Curtailing that "greater protection" did not operate to burden
minorities in the political process in such a way'1 79
as to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying them "equal protection."
Professors Amar and Caminker note an additional reason these litigants
failed to satisfy the Hunter Doctrine test: The challenged law had a "lack of
both a racial character and a political process burden" on minorities, in part
because it did not prevent the introduction of new busing legislation.' 80 The
Crawford Court determined that desegregative busing was racially neutral by
defining the issue as "neighborhood schooling," stating that "[t]he benefits of
neighborhood schooling are racially neutral. This manifestly is true in Los
Angeles where over 75% of the public school body is composed of groups
viewed as racial minorities."' 181 What the Court ignored was the high level of
residential segregation in California, which means that many neighborhoods
have a high degree of racial homogeneity. When neighborhoods are racially
homogeneous, neighborhood schools are racially homogeneous as well, and
any plan that sorts students into schools by their
residential address effectively
82
1
degree.
large
a
to
race
by
students
those
sorts
B. Amar and Caminker andIntent in Valeria

Professors Amar and Caminker provide a useful framework for analyzing
the Hunter Doctrine as a mechanism for challenging alterations in the political
process that "isolate public policy decisions intrinsically important to racial
minorities and make more difficult success by these groups in legislative
politics.'

183

Amar and Caminker break down the Hunter Doctrine into a two-

pronged analysis: (1) that the challenged law is "racial in character" and (2)
that it imposes an "unfair political process burden" on minorities.' 84 A law is
racial in character if it "regulates a racial subject matter, [and] it has a racial
179. Id.

180. Amar & Caminker, supra note 149, at 1026.
181. Crawford v. Bd. Of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 544 (1982) (showing the change from more than
50% white to less than 25% white students in the public school system in this area from 1968 to
1980).
182. See generally Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between
Residential Segregation and School Segregation, in IN PURSUIT OF A DREAM DEFERRED: LINKING

HOUSING AND EDUCATION POLICY 89-119 (Powell et al. eds., 2001).
183. Amar & Caminker, supra note 149, at 1024. For a detailed explanation of the Hunter
Doctrine and an analysis of its applicability to Proposition 209, see id; Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385, 389-91 (1969).
184. Amar & Caminker, supra note 149, at 1029.

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[88:299

impact, meaning it regulates the subject matter to the detriment of the racial
minority. ' 185 In evaluating the detrimental impact upon the racial minority,
Amar and Caminker emphasize the Hunter Court's reasoning that "'the reality
is that the law's impact falls on the minority' .. . because majorities ordinarily
do not need the protection of antidiscrimination laws, and thus lose very little
by an amendment that makes such laws less likely to be enacted. 18 6 Amar
and Caminker go on to state:
With respect to a given issue that is "racial in character," a state
constitution may either remain neutral or prescribe norms favorable to
racial minorities (which can later be repealed). But a state constitution
can never entrench a substantive norm with respect to an issue that is
"racial in character" in a direction that disadvantages a racial
1 87
minority.
CRECNO is an attempt to entrench a "substantive norm"-that of "Recno
blindness"--that disadvantages racial minorities. The question is whether this
norm is "racial in character" or is sufficiently general that the burden does not
fall on people of color as such.
In evaluating the prongs of the Hunter Doctrine test, it is not entirely clear
whether intent should be a component of the analysis. Amar and Caminker
note that in both Hunter and Seattle, the Court "declined to rest its decision on
a finding of invidious intent 188 and "eschewed any inquiry into invidious
motive" in Seattle.18 9 In fact, Amar and Caminker state that the Hunter
Doctrine cases do suggest that "disparate impact theory plays a more
prominent role in political rights cases than it does in other equal protection
settings."1 90 At least one scholar has suggested a modification to the Hunter
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1030 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
187. Id. at 1052 (emphasis in original). Amar and Caminker further state that this reading of
the Hunter Doctrine cases:
merely means that when the people of a state want to entrench a substantive norm at a
centralized level (such as the state constitution) and the norm will be detrimental to the
interests of racial minorities, the people must take care to define the norm in a sufficiently
general way-to avoid the impression of a gerrymander, if you will-such that the norm is
not "racial in character" as defined earlier.
Id. at 1053.
188. Id.at 1024.
189. Id. at 1024, 1030, 1034-35 and 1045-46 (stating that the Court's analysis of the Hunter
Doctrine is not an inquiry into illicit intent, but instead concerns minorities' equal access to the
political process, which triggers a focus on effect rather than subjective intent).
190. Id. at 1032.
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Doctrine to address the difficulty of proving intent. 1 9' Ellis suggests finding a
Hunter Doctrine claim in a facially neutral enactment that will contain a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification when:
(i) it modifies the existing political process to create a burdensome
extra step in the legislative process in order for a [suspect or quasisuspect class] to enact [constitutional] legislation in its interest; and
(ii) the circumstances of the legislation's enactment create an
inference that an improper motive was at work; but 92(iii) there is
insufficient evidence to prove a discriminatory purpose.'
However, the Ninth Circuit, following the Washington v. Davis line of cases,
recently determined that there is a third prong to the Hunter Doctrine analysis.
Purposeful discrimination, which has long been a requirement for traditional
equal protection violations, also is a required element to prove a Hunter
94
Doctrine violation. 193 Amar and Caminker's analysis, written years before,'
recognizes the Washington v. Davis line of cases but strongly disagrees with
the notion of an intent requirement in Hunter Doctrine jurisprudence.' 95
While the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided this particular
issue, it is important nevertheless to analyze the intent issue as the Ninth
Circuit has discussed it. In Valeria v. Davis, the litigants challenged the
California voters' approval of Proposition 227 as violating the Hunter
Doctrine. 196 Proposition 227 replaced the bilingual public education system
with an English language immersion system and limited the public's ability to
amend the system by requiring either a majority of the electorate or two-thirds
of each house of the legislature and the governor's approval. 97 The Valeria
court reasoned that:
[u]nder this "political structure" analysis, reallocation of political
decision making violates equal protection only when there is evidence
of purposeful racial discrimination. Be it an overt racial classification
or a context of discernible racial animus, constitutional "political
structure" analysis resembles "conventional" equal protection analysis
191. See, e.g., Gregory Ellis, Rethinking the Hunter Doctrine, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 323,

327 (1998).
192. Id. at 351.

193.
Dist. No.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch.
1,458 U.S. 457, 484-85 (1982)).
Amar & Caminker, supra note 149.
Id. at 1023.
Valeria, 307 F.3d 1036.
Id. at 1038; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 30 (West 2002).
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in that demonstrable evidence of purposeful racial discrimination is
required.

198

In analyzing the genesis of the Hunter Doctrine, the Valeria court states:
Hunter and Seattle stand for the simple proposition that strict scrutiny
applies if an initiative creates an outright racial classification, or if a
facially neutral initiative was driven by the racial nature of its subject
matter.... Given Proposition 227's facial neutrality, and the lack of

evidence that it was motivated by racial considerations, we hold that
over bilingual
Proposition 227's reallocation of political authority 199
education does not offend the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has determined that purposeful discrimination is
an element of a Hunter Doctrine claim where the challenged legislation is
facially neutral. This rule of law is inconsistent with the Seattle Court's
reasoning on the distinction between Hunter and Washington v. Davis.
In making this interpretation of the Hunter Doctrine, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the barriers to equal treatment that were erected by the challenged
legislation. The majority determined that the "[r]eallocation of political
power offends equal protection only when the racial implications of the
underlying issue determine the newlyformed [sic] decision-making
process. 2 °0 The court noted that the amendment in Hunter "operated to
prevent the city council from enacting ordinances to address racial
discrimination in housing,, 20 1 and the initiative in Seattle "placed special
burdens on the ability of minority groups to combat racially segregated school
districts., 20 2 The court went on to state that "[u]nlike ordinances enacted to
address pervasive racial discrimination in housing, or efforts taken by local
school boards to desegregate racially stratified school districts, California's
system of bilingual education did not operate to remedy identified patterns of
racial discrimination., 20 3 Thus, based on the reasoning in the Hunter Doctrine
cases, the converse also should be true, such that where the challenged
legislation seeks to eradicate a policy or program that did operate to remedy
identified patterns of racial discrimination, the legislation operates as a barrier
to minorities receiving equal treatment, on a theory that might be termed
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Valeria, 307 F.3d at 1040.
Id. at 1042 (citations omitted).

Id.
Id. at 1040.
Id.
Id. at 1041.
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"disparate political impact."
The court identified the purpose of the bilingual education program as to
"improve education, and not to remedy racial discrimination,, 20 4 and thus
Proposition 227 did not rest upon an invidious intent to curtail a remedy for
discrimination based on race or ethnicity. According to the court, the
demolition of the bilingual education system was not a racial issue but rather
an educational issue.20 5 This broad reframing of the issue was critical in
allowing the court to find race neutrality where a more narrow reading would
show the true racial or ethnic nature of Proposition 227. Still, the court tries
to have it both ways. Recognizing the "undeniable racial dimension" 20 6 to the
issue of bilingual education, the court stated: "While bilingual education has
obvious racial implications, the record establishes neither that racial
discrimination was the impetus of bilingual education, nor that racial animus
motivated the passage of Proposition 227. "2o7 Thus, the court concluded that
the "racial makeup" of the public student population "did not shape
Proposition 227's reallocation of political authority over bilingual
education., 20 8 The court seems to be implicitly reasoning that even though
the subject matter is racial, and the impact might be to the detriment of
minority students, there was no proof of intent to discriminate, nor any
invidious racial purpose motivating the legislation, and thus the Hunter
Doctrine claim must fail. It is interesting to note that the court did not address
the unfair political process prong of the test. The fact that the legislation
could be changed only by a voter majority or a supermajority of the
legislature along with the governor's affirmative approval imposes a more
substantial burden on those seeking to reinstitute bilingual education similar
to the burdens imposed in Otey v. Common Council. 209
In contrast to the Valeria court's reasoning on bilingual education
programs specifically, existing classification laws in the various states, while
once operating to discriminate against disfavored minorities, have been
operating to combat racial and ethnic discrimination by providing effective
mechanisms for identifying when and where discrimination does occur and
monitoring those mechanisms afterwards. Like the legislation struck down in
Hunter and Seattle, CRECNO would operate to prevent city councils, local
governments, and state agencies from enacting ordinances or implementing
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
addressed

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042.
Id.
Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
infra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
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policies designed to address and redress discrimination in our midst in two
ways: First, because the state will no longer have the data to support such a
need, and second, because as state institutions, they cannot "classify" without
the approval of two-thirds of the legislature and the Governor.
The analysis proceeds as follows: If CRECNO itself constitutes a racial
classification, then strict scrutiny applies, which in turn means that a
compelling interest must be shown and narrow tailoring will be required for
CRECNO to survive a constitutional challenge. If CRECNO does not
constitute a racial classification and is considered facially race-neutral, then in
the Ninth Circuit, strict scrutiny will apply only if racial motivations for the
legislation can be established by proof that the law was adopted because of,
and not merely in spite of, the racial nature of the subject matter. In the rest
of the nation, or at least in most other circuits, the question remains open as to
whether Romer v. Evans2 10 obviates the perceived need to prove intent in
Hunter Doctrine litigation.
C. Romer v. Evans and the PoliticalBurden on Identifiable Minority Groups
While it is well settled that the voters may decide to increase the burden
on everyone seeking to obtain a particular governmental benefit, when the
increased burden falls disproportionately upon members of an identifiable
minority group, strict scrutiny may be justified. The United States Supreme
Court addressed the notion of equal rights to obtain legislation in Romer v.
Evans.211 In Romer, Colorado voters approved Amendment Two to the state
constitution, which provided that no state departments, agencies, or political
subdivisions:
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
protected status or claim of
status, quota212 preferences,
discrimination.
The trial court struck down the amendment as infringing upon the
fundamental right to vote, as well as on Hunter Doctrine grounds.21 3 The trial
court determined that the initiative operated to repeal those laws and policies

210.
211.
212.
213.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
Id. at 625-26.
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that prohibited sexual orientation discrimination, stating that the "'ultimate
effect of Amendment 2 is to prohibit any governmental entity from adopting
similar, or more protective statutes, regulations, ordinances, or policies in the
future unless the state constitution is first amended to permit such
measures." 214 The trial court's main concern was with the future of
antidiscrimination laws because of the raised standard for reinstating those
laws.
The United States Supreme Court focused on both the current and the
future harm in identifying the crucial problem with Amendment 2 as that it
"withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from
the injuries caused by discrimination and... forbids reinstatement of these
laws and policies.215 The first point is of paramount importance in the
analysis of Recno classification data. In Romer, the withdrawal of legal
protection for the injuries caused by discrimination was based on a repeal of
antidiscrimination laws for gays and lesbians. If such discrimination is no
longer illegal, then legal protection against discriminatory acts is withdrawn
from gays and lesbians. While CRECNO does not repeal antidiscrimination
laws for racial and ethnic minorities, CRECNO seeks to similarly withdraw
protection for the injuries caused by racial and ethnic discrimination by
removing the best available and most widely used methods for establishing
the existence of the injury, and of linking up the causal connection between
the illegal discrimination and that injury.
On its second point, the Court seems to be slightly overreaching, because
while the amendment prohibited and rendered invalid all such policies,
reinstatement of the antidiscrimination policies was not forever foreclosed,
but rather could be accomplished through an additional amendment to the
state constitution. As a practical matter, however, the court did recognize the
near futility of seeking reinstatement, stating that gays and lesbians "can
obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting the
citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitution or perhaps, on the state's
view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability. 216 Similarly,
CRECNO mandates that the state citizens would have to change their minds
and agree once again to amend the state constitution, convince two-thirds of
the legislature and the governor to permit some classifications, or to enact
legislation that permits proof of racial discrimination without the use of racial
data, although such a notion is (bordering on the) absurd.

214. Id. at 627 (quoting Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 (Colo. 1993)).
215. Id.
216. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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The Court went on to state that:
[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense. "The
guaranty of 'equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws.'" 2 17
This protection means that a discrete and identifiable minority cannot be
prevented from obtaining legislation or governmental redress for
discrimination. In Romer, that minority was gays and lesbians, who as a class
are subject to mere rational review; with CRECNO, that minority is people of
color, who as a class, meet the requirements that trigger strict scrutiny. The
Court reasoned that "its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests., 2 18 Thus, the Court determined that the amendment did not even
meet the rational basis/legitimate purpose test because for gays and lesbians,
Amendment Two "inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries
that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for
it."52 19 Similarly the breath of CRECNO's prohibitions is inconsistent with the
reasons offered and thus might fail even rational review.22 °
D. Proving PurposefulDiscriminationThrough Unequal Treatment in
AntidiscriminationRemedies
Based on Valeria v. Davis22 1 and Coalition for Economic Equity v.
Wilson,222 a court, particularly one within the Ninth Circuit, may decide that
CRECNO does not constitute an explicit classification and is race neutral on
its face. Where the challenged legislation is race neutral, asserting an equal
protection claim requires a demonstration of purposeful discrimination.
Purposeful discrimination can be proven by intentional conduct, such as
where a law is adopted because of, and not merely in spite of, its effects on

217. Id. at 633-34 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
218. Id. at 632. Nevertheless, it is likely that a similar analysis would apply if a court
determined that rational review was more appropriate, and CRECNO could fail even under that lower
standard of review.
219. Id. at 635.
220. See also Spann, supra note 23, at 324.
221. 307 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2002).
222. 122 F.3d 692 (9thCir. 1997).
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racial minorities.2 23
If CRECNO eventually is passed by the voters of a state, it likely will be
because of, not merely in spite of, its effect upon racial and ethnic minorities
in the state. The causal relationship between CRECNO's classification
prohibition and the detrimental effect on people of color is not an intricate
one. The purpose of CRECNO is to prevent the state from recording
224
While the
information about the races and ethnicities of its citizens.
prohibition applies to white and nonwhite citizens alike, only people of color
will be affected and actually harmed by this rule because, as the Hunter Court
noted, minorities need the benefit of antidiscrimination laws and majorities
generally do not.225 This observation has taken on significantly greater
importance in the decades since the Hunter decision. As a brief review of the
recent racial discrimination cases demonstrates, people of color need the
numbers to prove their discrimination cases. These days, for people of color
at least, discrimination is less often displayed in an overt or intentional
manner sufficient to fulfill the purposeful discrimination prong.
Antidiscrimination cases generally rely upon statistical data 226 and arise in the
educational environment 227 and in the public contracting arena. 228 We no

longer have many of the more obvious manifestations of intentional,
purposeful discrimination against racial minorities that can be proven in court
Therefore, the classifications and
without statistical evidence.229
to identify the patterns of racial
necessary
recordkeeping schemes are
discrimination and to provide proof sufficient to mandate that a remedy be
imposed.
A critical problem is that CRECNO does not protect because the
roadblock to obtaining protection is too high. As Professor Charles L. Black
has noted, "[i]naction, rather obviously, is the classic and often most efficient
way of 'denying protection.', 230 In analyzing Reitman, Karst and Horowitz

223. Valeria, 307 F.3d at 1040; Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 704.
Statement,
at
Mission
54/
RPI's
Prop
Privacy
Initiative,
224. Racial
http://www.racialprivacy.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
225. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
226. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369-70 (1978); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 339-40, (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976).

227. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 370-72; San Antonio Ind.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
228. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485 (1989).
229. Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Barlow v. Davis, 85
Cal. Rptr. 2d 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing the important role statistics have in the
determination of discrimination claims).
230. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's
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noted that the "state can be said to authorize all conduct that it does not
prohibit, and in this sense the state is 'involved' in all private conduct that it
does not condemn." 23' Like the Reitman prohibition of any limitation on
housing transfers, CRECNO categorically prohibits any classification without
first circumventing one of the many roadblocks. As in Reitman, the only
options for redress were to obtain a two-thirds legislative majority (and the
governor's signature for CRECNO), or sufficient voter signatures to get
another constitutional amendment on the ballot, effectively assuring "special
immunity" to the discriminator. 232 CRECNO similarly erects a uniquely high
barrier to the interests of people of color by making it more difficult to combat
discrimination and redress violations of antidiscrimination laws.
A court could determine that CRECNO constitutes intentional
discrimination by reallocating societal resources based on the race of the
potential litigant.23 3 While whites could also rely upon statistical evidence to
prove a "reverse discrimination" or "antipreference" claim, as a practical
matter, most reverse discrimination cases do not rely upon statistical evidence
because the purposeful discrimination prong is met in form by using an
explicit racial classification and in substance by actually providing a
preference to a person of color.234 The main argument for antipreference
cases is the overt policy, the intentional purposeful granting of preferences
that can be proven without reference to statistical data. 235 In addition, when
statistical data is used in these cases, it is often used to show an impermissible
quota and usually is not used to prove the underlying policy. 236 Intentional
conduct is sufficient to satisfy the purposeful discrimination prong, and thus
no intent need be inferred from the circumstantial evidence of statistical
records based on racial and ethnic classifications.2 37 Accordingly, the loss of
statistical records will not change much in the way that reverse discrimination
and antipreference claims are litigated, but will have a dramatic impact on the
litigation of antidiscrimination cases.
Because
antipreference
and
reverse
discrimination
claims
Proposition14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 73 (1967).
231. Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive
Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 55 (1967).
232. Black, Jr., supra note 230, at 76, 79.
233. For a discussion of this argument in the context of Proposition 209, see Spann, supra note
23, at 293,299.
234. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); see also Amar & Caminker,
supra note 149, at 1055-56.
235. Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Ct. App. 2001).
236. Id. at 55-56.
237. See Grutter,539 U.S. 306;Adarand,515 U.S. 200; Wygant, 476 U.S. 267.

2004]

RACIAL PRIVA CY LEGISLATION

disproportionately involve white plaintiffs, and antidiscrimination claims
disproportionately involve plaintiffs of color, the antidiscrimination
plaintiffs- the plaintiffs of color-will suffer the greatest detriment in a state
that adopts CRECNO. As Professor Spann has noted in the Proposition 209
context, prohibiting preferences that favor people of color while failing to.
prohibit preferences that favor white males (such as legacies in the
educational setting) could constitute illegal discrimination against people of
Thus, by imposing a substantial roadblock in the path of
color.238
antidiscrimination litigants, CRECNO results in differential treatment for
antipreference laws benefiting whites, vis a vis antidiscrimination laws
benefiting people of color. The loss of statistics would regulate the subject
matter of racial classification to the detriment of racial minorities much more
heavily than to the detriment of the racial majority.
E. If CRECNO Is Determinedto Be FaciallyRace-Neutral,Does It
Nonetheless Violate the HunterDoctrine Because the Racial Implications
Determine the DecisionmakingProcess?
CRECNO also meets the second prong of the Hunter!Valeria test by
reallocating political decisionmaking based on racial implications. Under
subsection (a), which prohibits any Recno classification in the enumerated
state operations, those who seek racial classifications in education,
employment, or contracting can do so only if they can convince a majority of
the state's voters to reverse themselves. The Seattle Court recognized the
potential constitutional problem with a similar requirement stating that:
or
'desegregation
that
state
requirement
[c]ertainly,
a
antidiscrimination laws,'... and only such laws, be passed by
unanimous vote of the legislature would be constitutionally suspect. It
would be equally questionable for a community to require that laws or
ordinances 'designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect racial
minorities' be confirmed by popular vote of the electorate as a whole,
while comparable legislation is exempted from a similar procedure.
The amendment addressed in Hunter-and,as we have explained, the
than are these
obviously'emicious
legislation at issue here-was less
3t
different in principle.
no
was
but
examples,
Amendment Two in Romer provides another illustration of legislation
238. Spann, supra note 23, at 297 (noting that "when Proposition 209 invalidates a
constitutionally valid affirmative action program it precludes the possibility of any meaningful
remedy for past discrimination").
239. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486-87 (1982).

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW[

[88:299

going too far by decimating the protection of minority rights. While the
burden in CRECNO does not go quite as far as the examples cited in dicta by
the Seattle Court, neither did the legislation that was struck down in Seattle
and Hunter. Romer is much closer factually to this "parade of horribles," and
CRECNO falls in between the enactments from these precedent cases.
CRECNO mandates that existing laws, regulations, and ordinances that are
designed to protect racial minorities by monitoring their participation levels
and progress in the enumerated state operations be suspended or deemed to be
unconstitutional unless or until the state constitution is amended.24 °
State constitutional amendments are difficult to pass, and in California,
are permitted only where the voters pass a proposition by majority vote241 or
where two-thirds of the legislature agree 242 and then the voters adopt the
amendment by a majority vote. 243 These requirements are not quite as
stringent as requiring a unanimous legislature but still impose an additional
burden on those seeking the protection of racial and ethnic antidiscrimination
laws over those who seek the protection of other types of nonracial or ethnic
antidiscrimination laws in areas such as gender, religion, or sexual
orientation.244 Without CRECNO, the state can classify persons based on
Recno in the enumerated state operations, as long as the classification itself
does not amount to a discrimination or preference based on Recno, and the
compelling interest test is met in any subsequent challenge. If CRECNO
becomes law, the state cannot classify in the three enumerated areas at all as
long as CRECNO is the law.
In addition, CRECNO alters the authority for addressing racial problems
in the nonenumerated state operations under subsection (b) by requiring the
governor's approval in addition to a two-thirds vote of the legislature in order
240. Proposition 54 § 32(a)-(c).
241. CAL. CONST. art II, §§ 8, 10.
242. Id. art. XVIII, § 1.
The legislature by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership of
each house concurring, may propose an amendment or revision of the Constitution and in
the same manner may amend or withdraw its proposal. Each amendment shall be so
prepared and submitted that it can be voted on separately.
Id.
243. Id. art. XVIII, § 4.
A proposed amendment or revision shall be submitted to the electors and if approved by a
majority of votes thereon takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides
otherwise. If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the same election conflict,
those of the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.

Id.
244. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1965).
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to affect any classification.24 5 CRECNO potentially restructures the political
process in a second way by granting the governor a pocket veto power for
legislation classifying people based on Recno in the nonenumerated state
operations. Subsection (b) states that classifications in any other areas can be
permitted only when two-thirds of the legislature finds that the classification
serves a compelling interest, and the governor agrees.246 Declining to veto
any such legislation will not be sufficient to save it, unlike other legislation
that the governor declines to approve or veto, which generally becomes law in
ten days, notwithstanding his inaction.247 Thus, the ultimate power over the
reinstitution of Recno classifications in the nonenumerated areas of state
operations is transferred to the state's governor. Recall that Proposition 227
contained a similar provision, which the Valeria court interestingly did not
address. Those seeking to reinstate Recno classifications must convince a
supermajority of the legislature, as well as the governor, to support the
legislation, which is a substantial political process burden.
The legislative supermajority issue is reminiscent of the changes in
authority that the Supreme Court nullified in the Seattle and Hunter cases.
The Seattle Court reasoned that the only authority to be curtailed was that
involving the racial problems with public school busing 248 and determined that
the initiative affected a racial classification by removing the "authority to
address a racial problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing
decision making body, in such a way as to burden minority interests.,,249 The
Ninth Circuit later acknowledged this point, stating, "the state obstructed
equal education by removing only racially desegregative prerogatives from
the lawmaking procedure for all other educational matters.,, 250 By imposing
the two-thirds plus governor approval requirement on all Recno classifications
in other state operations, CRECNO would remove these classifications from
the existing decisionmaking structure-one that allows agencies, departments,
and other government instrumentalities to make classifications in their
discretion and pursuant to existing regulations, ordinances, and rules.
We must recognize, however, that the mere change in decisionmaking

245. Proposition 54 § 32(b).
246. Id.
247. The only exception is where the legislative session adjourns during that ten-day period. In
those cases, the governor's inaction would operate as a pocket veto. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §10;
LARRY N. GERSTON & TERRY CHRISTENSEN, CALIFORNIA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: A
PRACTICAL APPROACH 43 (1991); BERNARD L. HYINK ET AL., POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN

CALIFORNIA 121 (3d ed. 1959).
248. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982).
249. Id.
250. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 706 (9th Cir. 2001).
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structure alone is not fatal. But when that change results in an unusual burden
on proper minority interests, the reallocation of political decisionmaking
violates the Equal Protection Clause. As Professor Charles Black has
proposed:
where a racial group is in a political duel with those who would
explicitly discriminate against it as a racial group, and where the
regulatory action the racial group wants is of full and undoubted
federal constitutionality, the state may not place in the way of the
racial minority's attaining its political goal any barriers which, within
the state's political system taken as a whole, are especially difficult of
surmounting, by comparison with those barriers that normally stand in
the wax of those who wish to use political processes to get what they
want.
Consider also then-Solicitor General Marshall, whose brief in Reitman
stated that "by sheltering the right to discriminate in its constitution, the State
252
has accorded it a unique insulation from the normal political processes.
The brief further stated that this "enshrining.. . not only clothes it with the
traditional immutability that inures to constitutional texts, but places a very
serious burden on even the most dedicated advocates of repeal. 2 53 Like the
legislation limitation in Reitman, CRECNO would announce a constitutional
right to "not be counted" and would encourage discrimination by making it
virtually impossible to prove because every person will have the right to avoid
being classified by state actors. Recno counting can be reinstituted only if a
two-thirds legislative majority and the governor, or a majority of the state's
voters, adopt another amendment. Obtaining the support of the current
governor, along with a supermajority of legislators, would be a formidable
task indeed.
The Seattle Court stated:
But when the political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used
to address racially conscious legislation-and only such legislationis singled out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, the
governmental action plainly "rests on 'distinctions based on race.'
And when the State's allocation of power places unusual burdens on
the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically designed to

251. Black, Jr., supra note 230, at 82.
252. Karst & Horowitz, supra note 231, at 50 n.51 (quoting Brief for U.S. as Amicus Curiae at
26).
253. Id. (quoting Brief for U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 30).
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overcome the "special condition" of prejudice, the governmental
action seriously "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect the minority."
In Romer, the Court recognized the explicit denial of specific legal protections
against discrimination for the identifiable minority group comprised of gays
and lesbians.255 Similarly, CRECNO denies the protections gained from
monitoring and enforcing antidiscrimination laws for people of color.
In addition, like the burden found in the Seattle case, CRECNO places
"unusual burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact legislation
specifically designed to overcome the 'special condition' of prejudice. 256
This third unusual burden is the voter or two-thirds legislative hurdle. The
legislation to overcome prejudice consists of a variety of antidiscrimination
and participation monitoring laws and ordinances. If the state cannot have
racial categories, then groups cannot convince the legislature that there is a
problem for any particular racial group or that there is any need for additional
legislation to protect that group. All of these protections are to be abrogated
unless or until two-thirds of the legislature is convinced to identify a
compelling interest in maintaining those laws, and the governor is persuaded
to agree. Another even more unlikely option is available: to convince the
voters to repeal CRECNO, which is the same hurdle that the Romer Court
recognized as tantamount to "forbid[ding] reinstatement,' 257 of those
protections. Each of these'options makes it more difficult for people of color
to obtain redress for violations of antidiscrimination laws.
F. Does CRECNO Constitute a Racial Classificationor Is It Sufficiently
Racial in Characterto Implicate the Hunter Doctrine?
The basic, and perhaps all-too-quickly dismissed, question is whether
CRECNO makes an explicit racial classification. The subject matter of
CRECNO is to prohibit classifications and recordkeeping according to race,
ethnicity, color, and national origin, and thus its subject matter has an explicit
racial character. Under subsection (a), only Recno classifications
are
258
unaffected.
are
status
veterans'
and
religion,
gender,
whereas
outlawed,
There is a legitimate argument that CRECNO is a race-neutral regulation
254.
255.
256.
257.

Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 485-86 (1982) (citations omitted).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1996).
Seattle, 458 U.S. at 486.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.

258. Proposition 54 § 32(a). If the argument is that these areas were also the subject of the
voters' action in approving Proposition 209, then gender, which was included in Proposition 209,
should also be included here.
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of racial matters. It applies uniformly to people of all races and ethnicities,
and no particular races or ethnicities are singled out in its language.
Moreover, CRECNO is not itself a classification because it does not classify.
In fact, it expressly prohibits classifications of anyone's race regardless of
whether the person is white or nonwhite. In Coalitionfor Economic Equity v.
Wilson ("CEE"), 59 the Ninth Circuit addressed this issue, stating that
Proposition 209 did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because:
[r]ather than classifying individuals by race or gender, Proposition 209
prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender. A
law that prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or
gender a fortiori does not classify individuals by race or gender.
Proposition 209's ban on race and gender preferences, as a matter of
law and logic, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause in any
conventional sense.260
With this language as Ninth Circuit precedent, there is a strong argument that
CRECNO does not classify by race because it prohibits such classifying.
If one accepts this Ninth Circuit statement as binding authority, the
argument that CRECNO does not classify because it prevents classifying
misses the point of the Hunter Doctrine: that where the burden of the
challenged legislation falls more heavily on minority access to the political
process, the resulting unequal treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The "no classification" language will not necessarily save CRECNO from this
constitutional violation. A closer analysis of the reasoning of the CEE court
reveals the constitutional flaw in the Ninth Circuit's statement that a law
prohibiting classifications "a fortiori does not classify., 2 6 ' The court states
that when:
a state prohibits all its instruments from discriminating against or
granting preferential treatment to anyone on the basis of race or
gender, it has promulgated a law that addresses in neutral-fashion
race-related and gender-related matters. It does not isolate race or
gender antidiscrimination laws from any specific area over which the
state has delegated authority to a local entity. Nor does it treat race
and gender antidiscrimination laws in one area differently from race
and gender antidiscrimination laws in another. Rather, it prohibits all

259. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2001).
260. Id. at 702.
261. Id.
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race and gender preferences by state entities.262
This language demonstrates the permissible scope of race-related legislation:
In order to pass constitutional muster, the legislation must not isolate those
laws in the political process, and it must not treat racial antidiscrimination
laws in one area differently from racial antidiscrimination laws in another area
in a way that burdens minority interests.
The Valeria court describes the issue as whether the racial implications of
the underlying issue determine the decisionmaking process. 263 Does the issue
of classification have racial implications? Yes. The racial classification
either is not permitted, or under subsection (b) would not be permitted unless
or until there is a two-thirds legislative vote and the governor's approval. For
classifications that are not based on race, such as gender classifications, the
classification is permitted unless or until it is challenged in the courts. Thus a
racial classification must be approved by the legislature and the executive
branch and then will be subject to a challenge in the courts. On the other
hand, a gender classification is permitted without any legislative or executive
approval and is simply subject to a court challenge. While we want racial
classifications to be exceedingly difficult to uphold so that all improper and
illegitimate uses of race can be "smoked out," this additional step for Recno
classifications does not seem to further the purpose of curtailing illegitimate
racial classifications. Instead, this dichotomy illustrates the unequal political
burden for Recno classifications, especially in a state like California, whose
state constitutional jurisprudence mandates strict scrutiny for gender264 as well
as racial classifications.
In Hunter, the Supreme Court recognized that singling out fair housing
measures that addressed race amounted to an explicit racial classification,
stating there was an "'explicitly racial classification treating racial housing
matters differently from other racial and housing matters. ' '265 CRECNO
262.
263.
264.
529 (Cal.
265.

Id. at 707.
Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002).
Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195 (Cal. 1985); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d
1971).
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969) ("'If a governmental institution is to be fair,

one group cannot always be expected to win,' by the same token, one group cannot be subjected to a
debilitating and often insurmountable disadvantage."); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982). The Seattle Court stated that:
The initiative removes the authority to address a racial problem-and only a racial
problem-from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority
interests. Those favoring the elimination of de facto school segregation now must seek
relief from the state legislature, or from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all
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effectively singles out all racial classification and data collection matters from
all nonracial classification and data collection matters. It disadvantages those
who benefit from the monitoring of antidiscrimination laws by curtailing any
effective monitoring. CRECNO would remove the means of redress for a
racial problem and only a racial problem. Discrimination against women, for
instance, would still be subject to redress because the state still is permitted to
gather statistics on women, and women will have access to these statistics to
prove their disparate impact claims or to provide circumstantial evidence to
support their intentional discrimination claims. The effect for people of color
is that the state is providing less protection to people of color than to white
men and white women, thus isolating people along racial lines in the political
process.
One can argue, however, that the crucial feature of Hunter was that the
referendum applied only to the ordinance banning racial discrimination in
housing, and might have been acceptable if it had simply addressed
ordinances concerning racial discrimination in housing, whether such
ordinances are banning or permitting racial discrimination. It was one-sided
to the obvious disadvantage of racial minorities.266 But the essence of the
political restructuring claim is an unfair burden on the political minority and
thus an even broader ordinance-one affecting fair housing in generalwould not satisfy Hunter because the increased scope does not change the
analysis. As discussed above, the minorities are the ones who need the
benefit of fair housing laws in general. Thus, making it more difficult to enact
fair housing laws generally, in contrast to antidiscrimination laws in housing
specifically, still operates to disproportionately disenfranchise minorities. The
court implicitly recognized that the majority is not burdened by removing
fairness legislation.267 The law disadvantaged those who would benefit from
"laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as against those
who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise regulate the real

other student assignment decisions, as well as over most other areas of educational policy,
remains vested in the local school board .... The initiative expressly requires those
championing school integration to surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons
seeking comparable legislative action. As in Hunter, then, the community's political
mechanisms are modified to place effective decisionmaking authority over a racial issue at
a different level of government. In a very obvious sense, the initiative thus "disadvantages
those who would benefit from laws barring" defacto desegregation "as against those who..
would otherwise regulate" student assignment decisions; "the reality is that the law's
impact falls on the minority."
Id. at 474-75.
266. Amar & Caminker, supra note 149, at 1026.
267. Id. at 1030 n.42.
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estate market in their favor,, 2 6 8 and "[t]he state obstructed equal housing by
removing only racially fair housing prerogatives from the lawmaking
procedure for all other housing matters.,, 269 Thus, if one applies the reasoning
of the Hunter Court, CRECNO would constitute an explicit racial
classification by treating racial and ethnic classification and data collection
matters differently from all other classification and data collection matters.
G. Challengesto the Use of the Hunter Doctrine
The Hunter Doctrine has succeeded in striking down legislation in the
Hunter and Seattle cases but was found inapplicable in two important and
more recent cases, CEE270 and Valeria,271 as well as in Crawford272 and James
v. Valtierra.273 CRECNO is distinguishable from the legislative enactments in
each of those cases, and thus a Hunter Doctrine argument is more likely to
prevail in this context. For instance, Crawford stands for the proposition that
a "mere repeal" of stronger antidiscrimination laws is not actionable as long
as the minimum level of protection required by the Fourteenth Amendment is
maintained.274 The Crawford court stated that "[t]he simple repeal or
modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never
has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial
classification.,2 75 The legislation at issue in Crawfordwas determined to be a
mere repeal of existing beneficial laws, which exceeded the requirements of
the federal constitution such that their repeal did not bring California to
violate the federal constitutional standards. 276 The Court has recognized that
where the purpose of the repeal "is to disadvantage a racial minority, the
repeal is unconstitutional for this reason.', 277 Here, the repeal of beneficial
legislation that was not required by the Federal Constitution would be
Proposition 209, the constitutionality of which has been upheld by the Ninth

268. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.

269. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 706 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Hunter,
393 U.S. at 390.
270. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.2d 692.
271. Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002).
272. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
273. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Crawford, 458 U.S. at 556 (challenging a constitutional amendment that
prohibited state courts from mandating bus and pupil assignment except as a remedy for a specific
violation, which found that "'the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination
laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial
classification").
275. Id. at 527.
276. Id. at 528.
277. Id. at 539 n.21 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)).
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Circuit.278 While antidiscrimination laws provide a remedy for identified
patterns of racial discrimination, classification and reporting schemes are
somewhat different because they constitute a necessary component of
effective monitoring and enforcement of the level of protection guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Preventing the classifying, sorting, and even
counting of minority representation figures in enumerated state operations
erects a new barrier to equal treatment and thus is greater than a mere
repeal.2 79 In addition, CRECNO imposes a burden on future beneficial
legislation similar to the burden that was addressed in the Hunter, Seattle, and
Romer cases. CRECNO, then, seeks further to chip away at mechanisms for
redress that still exist in a state like post-Proposition 209 California, and
additionally seeks to erode, by requiring a two-thirds legislature and the
governor's approval, any preferences that were not outlawed by Proposition
209 by preventing any classifying that could form the basis for a
preference.28 °
The Hunter Doctrine argument also was unsuccessful for the challengers
of Proposition 209, for reasons distinguishable from the CRECNO situation.
In CEE,2 8' the political structure argument failed because the court determined
that the challenged legislation erected a barrier to preferences, and preferences
constitute "extra," not "equal," protection. Analyzing the district court's
reasoning for striking down portions of Proposition 209, the Ninth Circuit
recognized a burden on people of color because while before Proposition 209,
white women and people of color could petition their local governments for
preferential treatment in these areas, people of color and white women now
must garner enough votes for another statewide initiative in order to resume
receiving preferences. The court stated, "[w]e accept without questioning the
district court's findings that Proposition 209 burdens members of insular
minorities within the majority that enacted it who otherwise would seek to
obtain race-based and gender-based preferential treatment from local
entities. ' ' 282 However, this argument was not sufficient to support a Hunter

Doctrine claim because the court noted that:

[p]laintiffs challenge Proposition 209 not as an impediment to
protection against unequal treatment but as an impediment to
receiving preferential treatment. The controlling words, we must
remember, are "equal" and "protection." Impediments to preferential
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 2001).
See supra Part IV.A.
Proposition 54.
CoalitionforEcon. Equity, 122 F.3d at 708.
Id.at 705.
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treatment do not deny equal protection. It is one thing to say that
individuals have equal protection rights against political obstructions
to equal treatment; it is quite another to say that individuals have equal
protection rights against political obstructions to preferential
treatment. While the Constitution protects against obstructions to
equal treatment, it erects obstructions to preferential treatment by its
own terms.283
The court determined that because the Constitution already imposes a
burden against preferences, and the United States Supreme Court requires a
compelling interest and narrow tailoring to justify such preferences,
Proposition 209's obstruction of preferential treatment did not amount to a
constitutional violation.284
Based upon the CEE court's own reasoning, CRECNO classifies because
it isolates and provides for differential treatment. Racial antidiscrimination
laws in enumerated state operations are isolated from all other racial
antidiscrimination laws because only a constitutional amendment can permit
classifications in those areas.
Racial antidiscrimination laws in the
nonenumerated state operations are isolated from other racial
antidiscrimination laws because classifications will be permitted only where
two-thirds of the legislature finds a compelling
interest, and the governor also
285
specifically approves the classification.
CRECNO also violates the differential treatment prong of the CEE test in
two ways. Because of the relationship of classifications to proof of actionable
racial discrimination, CRECNO in effect provides different treatment for
racial antidiscrimination laws addressing preference issues than it does for
racial antidiscrimination laws addressing discrimination issues. In addition,
the plain language of the text of CRECNO explicitly treats the racial
antidiscrimination laws differently in enumerated and nonenumerated areas. 86
Furthermore, CRECNO imposes a political obstruction to equal treatment
because it burdens members of insular minority groups within the majority
who will enact the legislation, particularly those who would otherwise seek
enforcement of the antidiscrimination, as opposed to antipreference, laws.
The Seattle Court relied on the famous U.S. v. Carolene Products287 footnote
four, which states, "when the State's allocation of power places unusual
burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 708.
Id. at 708-09.
Proposition 54.
See id.§ 32(a)-(b).
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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designed to overcome the 'special condition' of prejudice, the governmental
action seriously 'curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities. ''288 "Protection" refers to the right to
equal protection of the laws, which includes an equal right to participate in the
democratic process of developing and changing those laws.289
In Valeria,290 the court determined that the Hunter Doctrine did not apply
because the equal right to participate was not curtailed for racial reasons, but
rather for reasons of education policy, and thus there was no evidence of
purposeful discrimination.29' Similarly, in James v. Valtierra,92 the Court
determined that the classification was not racial, but rather economic,
affecting low-income housing residents.293 As one commentator has noted,
"[c]rucial to the Court's analysis was its conclusion that public housing is not
a peculiarly racial concern. 294 CRECNO would accomplish more than
Valtierra's change in low-income housing policies, more than Valeria's
change in educational policies, and more than CEE's denial of extra
protection to vigorously pursue antidiscrimination policies. CRECNO would
operate as more than a mere failure to protect; it would distort the government
process by requiring a supermajority of the legislature and executive approval,
or a majority of the popular vote, in order to affect future classification
legislation. In the meantime, CRECNO would prevent the monitoring of
compliance with equal treatment laws and circumscribe the ability of potential
litigants to provide proof of their claims. It is likely that CRECNO would
deny some measure of equal protection to people of color in whatever state
enacts it. Therefore, strict scrutiny should apply 295 and the next step is to
determine whether CRECNO is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.

288. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982) (quoting U.S.
v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
289. Note that at least one district court has determined that that right is not violated by a
state's failure to "enforce its race-oriented policies as vigorously as its non-race-oriented policies."
U.S. v. City of Yonkers, 880 F. Supp. 212, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The Yonkers court noted that the
State of New York "addressed racial issues in education in ways that were less than optimally
beneficial to racial minorities. But it cannot be said that the State defendants distorted the
governmental process by adopting measures making it more difficult to pursue a political path
supportive of school desegregation." Id. at 238.
290. 307 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002).
291. Id. at 1042; see also supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text.
292. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
293. Id at 140-41.
294. Robert H. Beinfield, Note, The Hunter Doctrine: An Equal Protection Theory that
ThreatensDemocracy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 397, 421 (1985).
295. See infra Part IV.H.2.
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Will a Court FindThat CRECNO Violates the Hunter Doctrine?

1. Will a Court Even Address the Issue?
From all of these authorities, we see that the key to successfully
maintaining a Hunter Doctrine claim is that the state law must burden the
individual's right to equal treatment.
In Hunter, the lawmaking procedure made it more difficult for Nellie
Hunter to obtain protection against unequal treatment in the housing
market. In Seattle, the lawmaking procedure made it more difficult
for minority students to obtain protection against unequal treatment in
education. In Romer, Colorado's Amendment 2 denied homosexuals
[sic] the ability to obtain protection against discrimination, thus
classifying homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to
make them unequal to everyone else.296
Similarly, CRECNO makes it more difficult for minorities to obtain
protection through the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. Changing
whether statistics can be gathered by a particular state has a dramatic impact
on the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws because, for potential victims
of discrimination, the state's inability to gather statistics will make it harder to
obtain protection against unequal treatment. Those who seek such classifying
in other state operations need either to get the voters to reverse themselves, or
to get a two-thirds vote in the legislature and the governor's approval. Both
are higher hurdles for those seeking the benefits of antidiscrimination laws.
Nevertheless, a court is likely to defer to the voters' wishes in enacting
CRECNO and leave the battle for another day.
2.

If a Court Chooses to Address This Issue, Strict Scrutiny Should Apply

If CRECNO is determined to be racial in character in a way that
disadvantages people of color in the political process and thus meets the
requirements for establishing a Hunter Doctrine claim, then strict scrutiny will
apply. 297 Strict scrutiny involves a two-pronged test. The first prong is to
demonstrate that the challenged legislation serves a compelling state interest,
and the second prong is to establish that the means used to further that interest
are narrowly tailored.298 So let us examine some of the potential compelling

296. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotations omitted).
297. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 at 391-92 (1969).
298. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 469 (2003).
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state interests that a state seeking to follow CRECNO may assert, which
include remedying past discrimination, fostering diversity, and perhaps
promoting color blindness.
Remedying past discrimination has been widely used to justify race-based
classifications because the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that
remedying past discrimination constitutes a compelling state interest. 299 It is
likely that CRECNO proponents would argue that CRECNO seeks to remedy
past discrimination by preventing the continuation of preferential treatment
policies that exclude individuals based on their race. More specifically, of
course, the "preferential policies" included affirmative action, itself a remedy
for past discrimination, where the "racial discrimination" was against
members of the majority race.
The proponents of CRECNO may also assert that it seeks to remedy past
discrimination by preventing future discrimination, including future
preferences, and a court may determine that preventing future discrimination
is a separate compelling state interest. In either case, CRECNO accomplishes
this goal, on paper at least, by lessening the ability for state actors, again on
paper at least, to discriminate based on any Recno characteristic. If the state
actors do not know the race, ethnicity, or national origin of an applicant, then
the state actor cannot discriminate on that basis. The same argument applies
to preferences, which can be considered to be discrimination against the class
of people who do not receive the benefit of the preference. Thus, in a postCRECNO state, Recno preferences would be more difficult to implement, and
this difficulty would help a state like California to comply with the mandates
of its existing antipreference legislation.
The next question is whether the means chosen, preventing the
classification of any individuals in almost every state operation, are narrowly
tailored to serve any of these potentially compelling interests. CRECNO's
broad denial of the ability to classify in the three enumerated areas, 300 as well
as the higher hurdle erected for classifying in other state operations,3 °' is not
narrowly tailored to serve any of these interests. First of all, the classification
is but one step in the preference process, and while a preference cannot be
granted without some sort of classification, classifying alone does not
necessarily lead to impermissible preferences. Thus, the classification ban is
over-inclusive because it prohibits more than is necessary in furthering the
asserted compelling interest.
Second, CRECNO does not prevent the discrimination based on color that

299. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
300. See Proposition 54, § 32(a)-(c).
301. See id. § 32(b)-(c).
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can occur when state actors meet applicants face to face. No data need be
recorded, and the mental classification will be sufficient to permit
discrimination to continue. Thus, the prohibition on classifying also is underinclusive in preventing future discrimination based on color.
CRECNO supporters will suggest that its exception provides some narrow
tailoring to address the apparent over- and under-inclusiveness in the
legislation. Nevertheless, a court would likely find the exceptions to be
For instance, the Department of Fair
insufficiently narrowly tailored.
Employment and Housing ("DFEH") exception seeks to provide a ten-year
3 02
window for the DFEH to continue to collect and use Recno data.
Unfortunately, the DFEH is not responsible for prosecuting discrimination
cases 30 3 and does not actually collect most of the data it uses. Thus,
exempting the DFEH from CRECNO will have little practical effect on
CRECNO's effectiveness in remedying past discrimination. In addition, to
the extent that the ten-year time limit, the "sunset provision,''304 is considered
narrowly tailored, there is no way to tell when sunset is appropriate without
any numbers on who is doing what, where, and in what numbers. Ten years is
an arbitrary time frame, unsupported by any data, and thus will not suffice to
constitute narrow tailoring.
Another potentially compelling interest that may be asserted is diversity,
which the United States Supreme Court recently determined to be a
sufficiently compelling state interest to justify race-based affirmative action
programs.30 5 While it is not clear from the Grutter v. Bollinger3 6 decision
whether this interest is compelling outside of the educational context, if it is,
then the next question is the extent to which the prohibition is narrowly
tailored to serve the interest in diversity. It seems that a prohibition on
classifying is at cross-purposes with a goal of diversity because the progress
towards that goal cannot be measured without the classification and recording
of data. CRECNO supporters may argue that the prohibition against
classifying fosters a more natural, rather than engineered, diversity-a more
"true diversity"-but it is difficult to see how a refusal to acknowledge racial
and ethnic differences actually can promote racial and ethnic diversity. The
means do not seem to serve the interest in any concrete, let alone narrowly
tailored, way.
CRECNO supporters may decide to take a different route altogether, and

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.§ 32(e)-(e)(1).
See supranote 83 and accompanying text.
See supranote 88 and accompanying text.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id.

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[88:299

seek to have the courts find "color blindness" to be a compelling state interest
that satisfies the first prong of the strict scrutiny test. The color blindness
route would be a bold step, and one that was rendered less likely, at least in
the educational context, by the Grutter decision. 30 7 Nevertheless, in the public
employment and contracting areas, color blindness may be an appealing state
interest, and one that a court could find to be sufficiently compelling. If so,
the classification prohibitions are still not narrowly tailored to serve that
interest for the simple reason that color is evident with or without anything
but a mental classification. Race and ethnicity blindness often will be served
by the prohibitions, as will national-origin blindness when language and
accent are not at issue because most people cannot be certain that they
"know" a person's race, ethnicity, or national origin based simply on one
look. However, most people will be able to assign a color, with a high degree
of accuracy, based on that same look. The interest in color blindness itself
can never be served as long as people interact face to face with state actors,
and thus CRECNO cannot be sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the goal
of color blindness.
V. NOTWITHSTANDING THE POTENTIAL FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
CONFLICT, ARE THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF CRECNO PREEMPTED BY
FEDERAL LAW?

The preemption doctrine arises from the United States Constitution, which
states that the Constitution, "and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof ...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 30 8 Thus, when Congress
makes a law, "the federal law may supersede state laws and preempt state
3 09
authority, because of the operation of the supremacy clause of Art. VI.,,
The primary obligation is that the states follow federal law if it applies to
preempt state law. There are three types of preemption: express, field, and
obstacle or conflict. 310 The general rule is that "[f]ederal law may pre-empt
[sic] state authority, and supersede state law to the extent that the federal law
expressly repeals the state law, the state law contradicts a valid rule of federal
307. Id. at 343 ("In summary, the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's
narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.").
308. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
309. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317 (11 th ed. 1985).
310. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 226 (2000) (questioning the usefulness of
these categories and criticizing the general notion of obstacle preemption when it is addressed
without reference to a particular federal statute).
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law, whether it be an express rule or an implied rule," 311 or when the state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. 312 Field preemption does not apply in
the employment areas addressed by CRECNO, and thus this portion of the
Article will discuss express and obstacle preemption.
A. Express Preemption:Requiring or Permitting Unlawful Employment
Practices
Recently, the preemption argument was raised in the context of another
California state proposition. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether Proposition 209 was preempted by federal civil rights laws,
specifically the 1964 Civil Rights Act.3 13 Title VII of that Act contains a
specific provision on preemption, which provides that preemption will occur
only for "any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any
act which would
be an unlawful employment practice under this
4
subchapter."

31

In the CEE case, opponents of Proposition 209 argued that affirmative
action was not only permitted, but also encouraged by Title VII, and thus that
the Proposition conflicted with federal law.31 5 The Ninth Circuit determined
that Proposition 209 did not actually conflict with Title VII on the
employment issue, and therefore was not preempted by federal law, because
although Title VII permitted affirmative action, Title VII did not require
affirmative action, and Title VII did not require the granting of any
preferential treatment based on race.31 6 Moreover, the court found that
Proposition 209 did not "remotely purport to require the doing of any act
which would be an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. Quite the
contrary, '[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.' 317 The plain language of
Proposition 209 purported to prohibit, among other things, the very
discrimination that Congress sought to prevent when enacting Title VII.
At first blush, it seems that a similar analysis would apply to CRECNO,
and that CRECNO would not be preempted by this explicit Title VII
preemption provision because on its face, CRECNO does not require the
311. ld. at251.
312. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
313. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
314. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 708.
315. Id. at 710.
316. Id.
317. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971)).
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performance of any act that would be an unlawful employment practice under
Title VII. However, the more difficult question is whether CRECNO should
succumb to preemption on the grounds that it permits unlawful employment
practices to occur.
The CEE court did not specifically address whether Proposition 209
permitted unlawful employment practices,318 and there are two likely reasons
for this. First, the issue of permitting unlawful practices probably was not
addressed simply because the explicit terms of the proposition prohibited
discrimination in public employment. 31 9 Thus, its terms could not be
interpreted to permit discriminatory employment practices. Second, the issue
in that litigation was framed narrowly enough to make this argument largely
irrelevant. The court stated, "Plaintiffs challenge Proposition 209 not as an
impediment to protection against unequal treatment, but as an impediment to
receiving preferential treatment." 320 Because Title VII itself was deemed to
be an impediment to preferential treatment for the racial majority, Proposition
209's broader ban on preferential treatment based on race did not implicate
the issue of permitting unlawful employment practices. 321 If the issue had
been framed as an impediment to protection against unequal treatment, then
the argument would become one about equal protection, and what Proposition
209 permits may have been relevant to the court's analysis.
One can argue that the mere absence of enforcement mechanisms through
the compilation of statistical data does not actually permit unlawful
employment practices to occur in the State of California, just as the abolition
of affirmative action under Proposition 209 does not necessarily permit
unlawful discrimination.
However, there is a strong rebuttal to this
argument-that CRECNO would permit acts that constitute unlawful
employment practices because CRECNO's prohibition on recordkeeping
would make it substantially more difficult for plaintiffs to successfully
challenge unlawful employment practices, even though CRECNO does not go
so far as to authorize such unlawful practices. The legislative history of Title
VII recognizes the importance of recordkeeping, stating:
Requirements for the keeping of records are a customary and
necessary part of a regulatory statute. They are particularly essential
in Title VII because whether or not a certain action is discriminatory
will turn on the motives of the respondent, which will usually be best

318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
Proposition 209, § 3 1(a).
Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 708.
Id.
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by this pattern of conduct on similar occasions. The
of section 709 (c) have been carefully drawn to prevent the
of unreasonable burdens on business and there are more
customary
safeguards against arbitrary action by the
322

Commission.

Establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact employment
discrimination requires that the plaintiff "prove circumstances raising an
inference of discriminatory impact, plus the discriminatory impact at issue.,,023
The plaintiff can make this showing "usually through statistical disparities,
that facially neutral employment practices adopted without a deliberately
discriminatory motive nevertheless have such significant adverse effects on
protected groups that they are 'in operation . . . functionally equivalent to

intentional discrimination.' 32 4 Thus, without the statistical evidence, the
plaintiffs will be forced to prove intentional discrimination, and disparate
impact will no longer be a route available to them. Because proof of a
disparate impact necessarily requires an assessment of the numbers of people
within various racial or ethnic categories, CRECNO prevents proof of
disparate impact claims.
One way in which CRECNO would permit unlawful practices will arise
when the DFEH sunset provision takes effect. The DFEH exemption in
subsection (e) allows a state agency like California's DFEH to continue
classifying and recording Recno information until the exemption expires. 325 If
there is no legislative extension, in ten years DFEH will be subject to
CRECNO.
Subjecting DFEH to CRECNO would permit unlawful
employment practices to occur because without any racial classification,
inquiry, or collection of data, no disparate impact employment discrimination
charges will be filed against private employers within the state by the DFEH.
Moreover, private litigants will no longer be able to use data collected by
DFEH, and thus will effectively be foreclosed from stating a prima facie case
of employment discrimination. After the sunset provision takes effect, any
allegation that the employment practices of any private employer within the
State of California are in violation of Title VII would lack the necessary

322. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII & XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3045

(1968) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (noted in the floor manager's statement of Senators
Clark and Case).
323. Levy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 245 Cal. Rptr. 576, 581 (Ct. App. 1988) (certified for
partial publication).
324. Harris v. Civil Service Comm'n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 371 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988)).
325. Proposition 54 § 32(e)(1).
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statistical record to establish the requisite reasonable cause to justify filing a
charge against that employer for an unlawful employment practice.32 6
Without any monitoring or enforcement of the antidiscrimination laws, acts
that constitute unlawful employment discrimination by private employers will
be permitted to resume and continue, and thus will violate the specific
preemption provision of Title VII.
CRECNO can be distinguished from Proposition 209 on one other ground:
It does not reaffirm existing civil rights and antidiscrimination laws along
with its prohibition of classifications in state employment, and in effect
discourages the use of a crucial mechanism for monitoring and enforcing
those antidiscrimination laws. While it did not disavow antidiscrimination
laws, Proposition 209 abolished a mechanism of redress for discrimination,
specifically affirmative action and other preferential policies. CRECNO, in
contrast, abolishes a mechanism for monitoring behavior. In effect, CRECNO
provides that a state cannot check to see if it might be violating federal
antidiscrimination laws.
B. Obstacle Preemption: Conflicts With the Policiesand Underlying
Purposes of the FederalLaw
There is another general preemption provision that applies to the entire
1964 Civil Rights Act, which states:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in
which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the
same subject matter nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as
invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is
with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision
inconsistent
327
thereof.

CRECNO appears to conflict with the purposes and policies underlying
Title VII. The Declaration of Policy of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides
that "it is the national policy to protect the right of the individual to be free
from such discrimination," and that the purposes of these fair employment
laws are "to ensure the complete and full enjoyment by all persons of the
rights, privileges and immunities secured and protected by the Constitution of
the United States.

' 328

These rights include the right to equal protection of the

326. See generally supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
327. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2000).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (2000); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote 324, at 3034.
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laws, which is meaningless without equal enforcement of the laws in the
antidiscrimination context. Title VII recognizes the need for enforcement
information and specifically provides for the gathering of employment records
by requiring that, unless exempted, every employer:
subject to this title shall (1) make and keep such records relevant to
the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have
been or are being committed, (2) preserve such records for such
periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom, as the Commission shall
prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as reasonable,
necessary, or appropriate for the enforcement of this title or the
regulations or orders thereunder.3 29
This provision expressly precludes any claim of field preemption (the second
of the three, and the one we will not address here), and explains the obstacle
preemption in terms of inconsistency with purposes or provisions of the Civil
Rights Act.33°
The first inquiry is whether there is an actual conflict with a purpose or
provision of Title VII. 33 1 If there is a conflict, or no information, then courts
would look to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
guidelines to help interpret whether a conflict exists. The CEE court
determined that Proposition 209 was not "inconsistent with any purpose or
provision" of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, reasoning that the only statement in
Title VII as to preferences states that such preferences are not required, and
thus the two provisions are "entirely consistent.' 3 32 Accordingly, the court
found that under the general preemption provision of the Civil Rights Act,
Title VII did not preempt Proposition 209. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
determined that there was no need to address the guidelines because there was
no actual conflict, and thus no need for any further consideration.334
329. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (2000).

330. Id.
331. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 1997).
332. Id.

333. Id.The district court decision gave a more detailed analysis of this issue, which is worth
exploring here. The district court explained that in order to establish a conflict with the purpose of
the Civil Rights Act, one need not establish that affirmative action was mandated by the Act, but
rather "either that (1) the discretion to utilize voluntary affirmative action is necessary to achieve the
objectives of Congress or (2) such affirmative action is a method Congress intended to preserve
under Title VII is sufficient to establish that the prohibition of affirmative action would interfere with
Congressional intent." Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1513 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
334. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1513 (discussing more comprehensively the
contrary argument). The district court noted that Title VII does not address whether Congress
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Here there is an actual conflict on the issue of the classifying and
gathering of data, and thus there is no need to look to the guidelines. Section
709(c) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act specifically mandates the gathering of
data, and thus a purpose to gather data is clear from the plain language of the
Civil Rights Act. 335 CRECNO would eliminate this data gathering.

Employers are exempt from this recordkeeping requirement in states that
have fair employment laws, but the EEOC has discretion to require employers
to supplement whatever records are kept pursuant to the state law. 336 The
EEOC has the discretion to order compliance with such reporting
requirements in the form of requiring additional notations.33 7 The ability to
exercise this discretion to require additional notations relies upon an implicit
recognition that the existence of such fair employment practice laws means
that some sort of recordkeeping either expressly is required under those
laws 338 or implicitly is required to comply later with reporting requirements.

For instance, if data must be reported once every ten years, or even upon
request, the state agency is implicitly required to keep records so the
information will be there if and when it is requested. That recordkeeping
requirement may be explicitly stated in the statute, as in California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act, 339 or may be implicit, where employers are
simply required to produce certain information when requested, and thus most
employers gather the information as a matter of course so that the data is
intended to preserve voluntary affirmative action programs. Because the plain language of the statute
was silent on the issue, the district court turned to the EEOC's interpretation of the statute and noted
that the guidelines "reveal that Congress intended to safeguard the discretion to employ voluntary
race- and gender-conscious affirmative action as a means to allow 'flexibility in modifying
employment systems to comport with the purposes of Title VII."' Id. at 1514 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1608.1(c) (1964)).
335. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709(c), 78 Stat 241 (1964).
336. This section provides:
with respect to matters occurring in any state or political subdivision thereof which has a
fair employment practice law during any such period in which such employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee is subject to such law,
except that the Commission may require such notations on records which such employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee keeps or is
required to keep as are necessary because of differences in coverage or methods of
enforcement between the state or local laws and the provisions of this title.
Id. § 709(d).
337. Id.
338. One Senator explained this provision as follows: "The substitute language provides that
where records on employment practices are required by State laws or Federal Executive orders, any
additional information required by this law may be added to what is already being kept."
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 324, at 3031 (statement by House Manager on Senate Substitute).
339. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12930 (West 1992).
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available if and when it is requested.
The purpose behind the recordkeeping exemption was to avoid interfering
with state sovereignty when the states were adequately promoting and
enforcing antidiscrimination laws 340 and to avoid the undue hardship and the
burden of duplicate data collection. 34 1 In a post-CRECNO state, while
discrimination still will be outlawed, state laws will be ineffective in this area,
and fewer discriminators will be prosecuted because the pool of available
proof will shrink considerably as soon as CRECNO takes effect for a state
agency like California's DFEH.
In a post-CRECNO state, state employers will be prevented from
gathering this statistical evidence by constitutional mandate, despite the
continued existence of fair employment laws in the state. The state
instrumentality employers also are subject to the mandates of Title VII,3 42 and

thus the degree of "additional notations" that the EEOC is likely to require
will be significant and would result in a virtual suspension of CRECNO for
state employers if they are going to comply with the policies and purposes of
Title VII. In addition, when the DFEH exemption expires, that agency will be
prohibited from gathering Recno information from private employers within
the state. Those private employers still will be subject to Title VII, and thus
will have to provide statistical information in the form of "additional
notations" when required by the EEOC. This new reactionary system of
recordkeeping is likely to lead to a decrease in the accuracy of Recno data.
Thus, to the extent that a court determines that CRECNO is not inconsistent
340. Senator Clark remarked:
It is important to note that title VII is so drafted that the states and the Federal Government
can work together. When the bill is enacted, the State and the municipal agencies will
continue to operate, and State laws will continue in force, except where they are
inconsistent with title VII. The Federal Commission can agree under title VII not to bring
any suits in cases in a particular State or locality where the State or locality has adequate
power under its own laws or ordinances to carry out the purposes of the act and it is

effectively exercising that power.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 324, at 3345 (Senator Clark's remarks). Senator Clark's remarks

continued with:
So, I take it that title VII meshes nicely, logically, and coherently with the State and city
legislation already in existence in a number of the States and a number of our cities, small
as well as large. The Federal Government and the State governments could cooperate
effectively and, to some extent at least, there would be a saving in the Federal budget in
those areas where State laws are effective, discrimination is outlawed, and discriminators
are prosecuted.
Id.
341. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 324, at 1018, 3056.

342. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17 (2004).
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with any express provisions of Title VII, CRECNO should still be found to be
inconsistent with the purposes and underlying policies of the Title VII datacollection provisions.
Of course, it also is likely that a court will decline to decide the
preemption issue as "unripe" until the EEOC fails to order recordkeeping. A
court is likely to try to avoid a decision on preemption by giving effect to
CRECNO and to Title VII. Unless the EEOC orders data and a state agency
refuses to comply, or the EEOC fails to order additional notations and a state
citizen files suit, this controversy may not be ripe for adjudication. When a
judicial decision becomes appropriate or necessary, however, the court should
find preemption. In the meantime, uncertainty will reign because this
inconsistency suggests that the portion of CRECNO that applies to state
instrumentality employment and agencies-like the DFEH's monitoring of
private employment within the state-is preempted by Title VII.
C. Does CRECNO Conflict With Title VI's Funding Provisions?
We must also consider whether CRECNO conflicts with Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which governs requirements for federal funding.343
No such conflict was found with Proposition 209.
In fact, even the district
court in CEE determined that there was no actual conflict between Title VI
and Proposition 209.
Unlike the federal law conflict exemption that saved
portions of Proposition 209 from conflicting with, and being preempted by,
Title VI, the almost identical provision will not save CRECNO from
preemption. On the issue of Proposition 209, the district court reasoned that
even though Title VI sometimes does require affirmative action, a failure to
practice affirmative action when required by Title VI would result in a loss of
federal funds.346 Any such failure triggers subsection (e) of Proposition 209,
which mandates that that compliance be excused where compliance results in
a loss of federal funding.347 Thus, the district court determined that plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden on the Title VI preemption claim.348 Similarly,
subsection (i) of CRECNO is triggered to prevent the prohibition of action
that must be taken to avoid a loss of federal funding.349
343. 42 U.S.C. 2000d-2000d-7 (2000).
344. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122
345. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946
346. Id. at 1518.
347. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 1(e).
348. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp.
Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 1997)
on appeal).
349. Proposition 54 § 32(i).

F.3d 692, 709 n.19 (9th Cir. 1997).
F. Supp. 1480, 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

at 1519, pet. reh'g denied, Coalition for Econ.
(Plaintiffs did not allege a conflict with Title VI
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However, CRECNO also contains an additional clause, a limitation to
avoid prohibiting action that must be taken in order to comply with federal
law. 350 Federal law does not require the gathering of these statistics in states
with fair housing laws, and thus, as long as California has fair housing laws,
the state is not required to gather the information but merely to provide
supplemental information as needed. 351 A straightforward interpretation of
the plain language of CRECNO suggests that the subsection (i) limitation will
NOT apply to anything but the need to supplement as requested by the
EEOC.352 This means that state agencies will not classify and gather the data
until the EEOC demands or requests the information. Only a failure to
respond to the EEOC request can trigger a loss of federal funding, which in
turn activates the subsection (i) exemptions. At that point, the historical
record of data will be interrupted, and some information will not be
recoverable after the fact. The interruption of data postpones effective
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, particularly for disparate impact
claims, and therefore is likely to violate the underlying policies, though not
the express provisions, of Title VI.
Willful blindness to statistical measures of the actual enjoyment of the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution denies the full measure of equal
protection to those who most need the benefit of the antidiscrimination laws
such as Title VI and Title VII. CRECNO is inconsistent with the policy of
protecting individuals from discrimination and the asserted purpose of
ensuring the complete and full enjoyment of the privileges and immunities of
the Constitution. Thus, it is likely that should the controversy become ripe, a
court would find that the employment provisions of CRECNO are preempted
by Title VI and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
As currently drafted, CRECNO is neither strong legislation nor
appropriate political policy. Some of the definitions are ambiguous, and the
description of the procedures for approving classifications is misleading. The
exceptions are incomplete, and in some instances illogical or wholly
ineffectual. Moreover, the employment provisions likely are preempted by
Titles VI and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The most troubling aspect of CRECNO is the substance of the measure,
which requires the state to ignore the continuing significance of race in the
most important of state operations. CRECNO violates the Hunter Doctrine by
350. Id.
351. See supra Part V.A.
352. Proposition 54 § 32(i).
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imposing an unfair political process burden on people of color who seek to
enforce their civil rights through either the legislative or judicial process.
While CRECNO does not repeal existing antidiscrimination laws, it does
render the protection of those laws ineffective by removing the primary
mechanism of proof in racial and ethnic discrimination cases-the data on the
races and ethnicities of the alleged victims-as well as on the available pools
of candidates, applicants, and employees. As the database of racial and ethnic
identities diminishes, so would the enforceability of civil rights protections
under existing jurisprudence. Any decrease in the enforcement of racial
fairness legislation has a disproportionate impact on those most likely to be
treated unfairly because of their race. Therefore, regardless of whether
CRECNO is determined to be a race-based measure, due to the racial
character of its subject matter, or a race-neutral measure that uses the subject
of race to determine which political decisionmaking process will apply, it is
unlikely that CRECNO can serve a compelling governmental interest in a way
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny.
In an antidiscrimination case, counting race is all the plaintiff has to prove
her claim. Covering race with a cloak does not make it go away, it simply
means that we cannot see it and thus cannot count it. If the state cannot count
race, then true victims of civil rights violations cannot obtain justice, and the
colorblind paradigm will not be achieved.

